Unhappy Development: Dissatisfaction With Life on the Eve of the Arab Spring

Abstract

AND ElEna ianchovichinaWorld Bank AND tina röhricht and ruut vEEnhovEn Erasmus University RotterdamDespite progress with economic and social development over several decades, life satisfaction was relatively low and declining in many developing Arab countries in the second half of the 2000s-a situation described in this paper as the "unhappy development" paradox. The paper empirically tests the direction and strength of association of a range of objective and subjective factors with subjective well-being in the Middle East and North Africa in the years immediately preceding the Arab Spring uprisings (2009-10). The findings suggest a significant, negative association between life satisfaction levels and each of the main perceived grievances voiced during the 2011 uprisings-dissatisfaction with the standard of living, poor labor market conditions, and corruption in the form of nepotism or cronyism. The increased prevalence of dissatisfaction with the standard of living contributed the most to the decline in subjective well-being during this period, followed by worsening labor market conditions manifested in increased unemployment and decline in self-reported earnings. In addition, perceptions about corruption became more important for people's life satisfaction, particularly in the Arab Spring countries where the uprisings were most intense.JEL Codes: D60, I31, Z13 economies, except the Republic of Yemen, and was low on average. The incomes of the bottom 40 percent, measured as 2005 PPP-adjusted per capita expenditure, grew at higher rates than average expenditures in many developing Arab countries for which information was available (Ianchovichina 2018). The Gini inequality indexes were moderate by international standards and did not worsen in most MENA economies (Ianchovichina 2018). Importantly, over the past decades the region had made notable strides in reaching not only the Millennium Development Goals related to poverty and access to infrastructure services (especially drinking water and sanitation and Internet connectivity), but also those related to reducing hunger and child and maternal mortality, and increasing school enrollment (Iqbal and Kiendrebeogo, 2016).Prior to the Arab Spring uprisings, most developing MENA countries were seen as relatively stable places. Only two MENA countries-Iraq (7th) and the Republic of Yemen (15th) -made it to the top 25 of the 2010 Failed States Index 1 of Foreign Policy. Libya and Tunisia were ranked 111th and 118th of 177 countries, respectively, and so they appeared among the stronger and less fragile countries in the world (Goodwin, 2011). With autocratic rulers in power for many years, the cracks in these countries' models of government remained invisible to most 1 The Failed States Index measures stability based on economic, political, and military indicators. Figure 1a. Satisfaction with Life and GDP per Capita, 2007-10. Note: Numbers are weighted averages for 145 countries. Abbreviations: EGY = Egypt; JOR = Jordan; LBN = Lebanon; MAR = Morocco; WBG = West Bank and...

Welfare Dynamics With Synthetic Panels: The Case of the Arab World In Transition

“…Consequently, these subjective well‐being data capture the increased frustration with symptoms of a broken social contract . In particular, governments slowed down or stopped hiring workers and the quality of public services deteriorated considerably (Arampatzi et al, ), which resulted in the need to increase spending on private services (Devarajan and Ianchovichina, forthcoming). Learning outcomes were disappointing and teacher absenteeism rates in public schools in MENA were among the highest in the world (Brixi et al, ).…”

“…Relying exclusively on objective data to measure welfare dynamics accurately can be misleading as suggested by Easterlin’s “unhappy growth” paradox (see, e.g. Stevenson and Wolfers (), Graham and Lora (), Easterlin et al, ()) in general, and the “unhappy development” paradox observed by Arampatzi et al () in Arab countries in particular during the period preceding the Arab Spring . Using both types of measures therefore is a good way to obtain a more comprehensive picture on welfare dynamics.…”

Subjective Well-Being and Peaceful Uprisings

“…Hence, at the between-country level there is little evidence of a relationship between GDP growth and subjective well-being. In several countries with an average GDP growth rate of more than 4%, most notably Sudan, Rwanda and India, there was a substantial increase in the percentage of people suffering, consistent with the existence of the so-called "unhappy development" paradox (Arampatzi et al, 2018). Angola also stands out, with a 7% increase in suffering despite a positive GDP growth rate.…”

“…We also include a measure tracking the views of informed public opinion experts and business people of corruption in the public sector from Transparency International. Widespread government-related corruption has been identified as a major source of dissatisfaction with the regime, including more recently during the Arab Spring (Arampatzi et al, 2018). However, the individual grievances inflicted by corruption might be more accurately captured by the subjective well-being variable.…”

“…In these cases, objective indicators reveal signs of optimism, whereas subjective indicators could indicate that anti-government sentiments are on the rise. This mechanism was at work during the Arab Spring, which was preceded by a period of 'unhappy development' in many Arab countries, especially the ones where the uprisings were most intense (Arampatzi et al, 2018). This paper tests whether subjective well-being data can explain variation in nonviolent conflict going beyond what is captured by the typical objective measures.…”