Uniform Price Auction of Divisible Goods Based on Multiple Rounds Linear Bidding and Its Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract

In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique.

Compound Mechanism Design onMulti-attributeand Multi-source Procurement of Electricity Coal

“…In recent years, the multi-attribute auction has become quite active in the eld of auction study. Practice has proved that multi-attribute auction is a short-term and e cient procurement mechanism [5,6,11,17,18]. Bichler [4] de ned multi-attribute auctions as a class of market mechanisms, which enable automated negotiation on multiple attributes (such as delivery time, quantity, quality, and credibility) of a deal.…”