Unifying Agency. Reconsidering Hans Reiner’s Phenomenology of Activity

Erhard, Christopher

doi:10.1007/s10743-018-9235-6

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 16 publications

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“…The articulation of intending and executing through partial and total intentions was reformulated with explicit reference to the paradigm of double intentionality by Hans Reiner (1927), who focuses on the relation between total unitary action and its partial moments (see Erhard 2019). What the action of buying the cake explicitly intends is something that transcends the action itself, for example, possessing the cake in order to be able to share it with others at a party or to enjoy it during the coffee break.…”

Section: Goal-orientedness and Execution In The Phenomenology Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Double Intentionality

Summa

Klein

Schmidt

2021

Topoi

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Section: Goal-orientedness and Execution In The Phenomenology Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Double Intentionality

Summa

Klein

Schmidt

2021

Topoi

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Striving, Willing, and Acting in Pfänder and Husserl

Mertens

2024

Hum Stud

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This article presents a mutual critique of the analytic and phenomenological theory of action. The first perspective focuses on the standard approach introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe. According to Anscombe, actions are events that are intentional under a description. Consequently, the distinction between action and mere behavior depends on the linguistic description of behavior. However, this perspective fails to address the possible transitions between behavior and action. One way to fill this gap is by investigating the specific form of intentionality belonging to striving or tendency. Such an investigation can complement the standard theory of action by illuminating the realm in which volitional and intentional actions are formed. In this regard, it is instructive to examine A. Pfänder’s and E. Husserl’s philosophy of striving and willing. Pfänder’s Phenomenology of Willing (1900) and the essay Motives and Motivation (1911) reflect on the genesis of volition from striving. Both texts view willing as a particular form of striving that may, but does not have to, lead to action. Similarly, Husserl aims to retrace the pre-voluntary roots of willing, but unlike Pfänder, he considers willing and action to be necessarily connected. The second perspective focuses on what analytic philosophy contributes to philosophical action theory: the recognition of language’s constitutive role in determining actions. This is evident not only in terms of how we describe actions (Anscombe), but also in how we ascribe willing, intending, and acting to one another in communicative contexts (H.L.A. Hart). Therefore, a phenomenological investigation of action should be complemented by linguistic analysis. This idea is already outlined in rudiments by Husserl and particularly by Pfänder.

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Volitional causality vs natural causality: reflections on their compatibility in Husserl’s phenomenology of action

Spano

2021

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Unifying Agency. Reconsidering Hans Reiner’s Phenomenology of Activity

Cited by 5 publications

References 16 publications

Introduction: Double Intentionality

Introduction: Double Intentionality

Striving, Willing, and Acting in Pfänder and Husserl

Volitional causality vs natural causality: reflections on their compatibility in Husserl’s phenomenology of action

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