Unifying Group Rationality

Abstract

Various social epistemologists employ what seem to be rather distinct notions of group rationality. In this essay, I offer an account of group rationality that is able to unify the dominant notions present in the literature under a single framework. I argue that if we employ a teleological account of epistemic rationality, and then allow that there are many different epistemic goals that are worth pursuing for various groups and individuals, we can then see how those seemingly divergent understandings of group rationality are all intimately related. I close by showing how the view has the additional benefit of allowing us to generate practical, normative suggestions for groups in the real world.

How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations

“… 20. That is, I deliberately bypass the discussions on group rationality and collective decision-making, both because I do not have enough space and because they are not relevant to my argument. See, for instance, Kopec (2019). …”