2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2012.01470.x
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Unilateral Climate Policy and Competitiveness: Economic Implications of Differential Emission Pricing

Abstract: Unilateral climate policy raises concerns about international competitiveness and emission leakage that result in preferential regulatory treatment of domestic energy‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) industries. Our applied analysis of unilateral EU abatement illustrates the potential pitfalls of climate policy design which narrowly focuses on competitiveness concerns about EITE industries. The sector‐specific gains of differential emission pricing in favour of these branches must be traded off with the addi… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Böhringer et al (2011b) show that as the climate coalition gets larger, the efficiency costs of implied output subsidies ultimately outweigh the benefits of reducing emission leakage. As to preferential emission pricing for EITE industries as well as Böhringer and Talebi (2012) find substantial justification for emissions price differentiation to deter leakage but caution on substantial excess cost is warranted as unilateral reduction targets are more moderate and EITE industries get close to exemptions. 1 Our contribution to the economic literature on unilateral climate policy design is twofold.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Böhringer et al (2011b) show that as the climate coalition gets larger, the efficiency costs of implied output subsidies ultimately outweigh the benefits of reducing emission leakage. As to preferential emission pricing for EITE industries as well as Böhringer and Talebi (2012) find substantial justification for emissions price differentiation to deter leakage but caution on substantial excess cost is warranted as unilateral reduction targets are more moderate and EITE industries get close to exemptions. 1 Our contribution to the economic literature on unilateral climate policy design is twofold.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%