Unilateral Orders as Constituency Outreach: Executive Orders, Proclamations, and the Public Presidency

Abstract

Scholarship on the unilateral presidency has focused on presidential policy making with the stroke of a pen. However, such studies overlook the influence that the public presidency can have on shaping the president's unilateral strategies. Our research question seeks to link these two elements by exploring the following question: under what conditions do presidents issue executive orders and proclamations as part of their public presidency? Using new data charting the use of these directives to target populations in society, we analyze the role of the political environment on engendering both more constituency-based executive orders and proclamations. The results suggest presidents issue more constituencybased proclamations, but not executive orders, when Congress and the executive branch are more likely to disagree on policy or when Congress is institutionally stronger compared to the president. Presidents are less likely to issue these orders during election years (for proclamations), in changing popularity, or when their party has returned to office. The implications suggest the importance of broadening the study of unilateral orders to link the public and administrative presidencies.Scholarship on the unilateral presidency has focused on presidential policy making with the stroke of a pen, with attention placed on presidential executive orders (Howell

Presidential Unilateral Action as a Tool of Voter Mobilization

“…In addition to this partisan loyalty, presidential unilateral action on a certain policy provides additional expressive benefits of voting to those supporters who deeply care about the policy. Such a presidential strategy of targeting particular constituencies is consistent with previous studies (Bueno de Mesquita et al ; Kriner and Reeves ; ; Rottinghaus and Warber ). Therefore, the president may attempt to secure electoral victory by using unilateral power to mobilize potentially pivotal supporters rather than to appeal to voters from the opposing party.…”

The Contemporary Presidency: How Presidents Utilize Their Emergency Powers

“…Finally, our study adds to growing literature on the unilateral presidency. In their assessment of the conditions under which presidents use unilateral orders as part of their public presidency strategy, Rottinghaus and Warber (2015) find that the political environment plays an important role in the number of constituency‐based executive orders and proclamations. We add to the understanding of presidential messaging and communications with the public by examining the content of presidential decisions to extend national emergencies.…”

“…More recently, works on the unilateral presidency identify the use of unilateral directives for sending messages to constituency groups. Assessing how presidents employ executive orders and proclamations as part of their public outreach efforts, Rottinghaus and Warber (2015) find important differences in how presidents utilize ceremonial proclamations versus constituency executive orders. For instance, whereas Democratic presidents issue more executive orders for constituency outreach, they are less likely to use ceremonial proclamations for similar purposes.…”

“…For instance, whereas Democratic presidents issue more executive orders for constituency outreach, they are less likely to use ceremonial proclamations for similar purposes. As Rottinghaus and Warber (2015) note, "being more visible orders, presidents may be reluctant to issue an executive order in these circumstances, whereas they may be more willing to issue a proclamation that may be less visible [to reach out to different constituent groups]" (304).…”

Symposium on Policy Making, Accountability, and Executive Action: Introduction

“…Focusing particularly on the institutional constraints on the use of unilateral power, empirical and theoretical research has provided new and important insight into how the adjoining branches of government constrain presidential behavior (a very partial list includes Bolton and Thrower ; Chiou and Rothenberg ; Howell ; Kennedy ; Lowande ; Mayer ; ; Moe and Howell ; Thrower ). More recently, scholars have investigated how unilateral power may also be responsive to public opinion (Christenson and Kriner ; Judd ; Lowande and Gray ; Posner and Vermeule ; Reeves and Rogowski ; ), electoral and partisan constituencies (Rottinghaus and Warber ), and interest groups (Foster ).…”