Union suppression and certification success

Abstract

Over the past decade a number of provinces have abandoned the long-standing Canadian tradition of automatic certification of unions based on card-signing and instead opted for mandatory representation voting. This trend, however, has developed with little understanding of the effectiveness of management opposition within a voting regime. In this paper the impact of union suppression on union organizing success within the voting regime of British Columbia is examined. We find that union suppression tactics were highly effective with estimates rivalling those found in the United States. Moreover, results from instrumental variable models suggest that OLS estimates may seriously underestimate the true impact of suppression.Effort de suppression du syndicat et succès dans le processus de certification. Au cours de la dernière décennie, un certain nombre de provinces canadiennes ont abandonné la pratique traditionnelle de certification automatique des syndicats sur la base des signatures de cartes d'adhésion au syndicat, et ont choisi de réclamer un scrutin pour déterminer le support des membres potentiels. On ne comprend pas bien l'efficacité de l'action d'opposition des patrons au syndicat dans ce régime de scrutin. Ce mémoire examine l'impact des efforts de suppression des syndicats sur les succès des syndicats dans leurs efforts d'organisation dans le cadre du régime de scrutin en Colombie Britannique. On découvre que ces tactiques ont été très efficaces, tout autant qu'aux Etats-Unis. De plus, les résultats obtenus à l'aide de modèles de variables instrumentales montrent que ceux qu'on obtient à l'aide de la méthode des moindres carrés ordinaires peuvent sous-évaluer l'impact des tactiques de suppression de manière significative.

Employer Resistance to Union Certification

“…Another Canadian study focused on the impact of employer suppression on union organizing success within a mandatory vote regime by analyzing certification-related unfair labour practices in British Columbia privatesector organizing campaigns in 1987 and 1988. Results provide new evidence that where Canadian certification procedures resemble those in the U.S., unfair labour practices can have comparably detrimental effects, reducing union win rates generally by 21 percent and by an even greater measure in certain industries (Riddell 2001). …”

“…Getman, Goldberg and Herman's conclusions, or lack thereof, are countered by Dickens' (1983) study that utilized the same data yet found a significant negative relationship between employer resistance activities during union election campaigns and workers' support for unionization. o 1 Thomason 1994aThomason , 1994bThomason and Pozzebon 1998) and/ or the percentage of union election wins (see, for example, Drotning 1967;Prosten 1979;Roomkin and Block 1981;Seeber and Cooke 1983;Lawler 1984;Cooke 1985a;Reed 1989;Freeman and Kleiner 1990;Bronfenbrenner 1996Bronfenbrenner , 2000Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1994;Riddell 2001). Some of the many employer responses that have been shown to negatively affect these certification outcome measures include: dismissing union organizers or supporters (Cooke 1985a;Bronfenbrenner 1994;Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998;Riddell 2001); being charged with an unfair labour practice (Hunt and White 1985;Koeller 1992;Thomason 1994aThomason , 1994bRiddell 2001); communicating anti-union sentiments directly to employees by means of letters, and/or one-on-one or captive-audience meetings (Drotning 1967;Dickens 1983;Bronfenbrenner 1994Bronfenbrenner , 1996Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998;Thomason and Pozzebon 1998); restricting union access to the workplace or supporters' ability to engage in workplace solicitations (Lawler 1990); monitoring employees (Bronfenbrenner 1996); hiring consultants to assist in the employer's campaign (Lawler 1984;…”

“…A study using Canadian data found heterogeneous bargaining units containing a mix of occupations had greater success in elections determined by pre-hearing votes but that units composed solely of office workers came out ahead in certifications determined by membership card evidence (Thomason 1994a). Bargaining units in different industries will have varying degrees of homogeneity and will be composed of different types of workers, perhaps with different attitudes toward unionization, and these will influence certification success (Riddell 2001). Finally, a large body of research exists that examines the influence of the tactics used by, and characteristics of, union organizers.…”

“…Accelerated certification procedures and restrictions on employer behaviour that are both more strict and more strictly enforced than in the United States were assumed to have so decreased the manifestations of employer opposition as to virtually obviate their negative impacts. However, recent evidence suggests the popular conception of Canadian employers as less willing to oppose unionization than their U.S. counterparts may be mistaken (Saporta and Lincoln 1995) and that employer resistance in Canada may not be as infrequent or as innocuous as assumed (Thomason 1994b;Riddell 2001). Furthermore, some evidence suggests that while the per-certificationapplication incidence of employer unfair labour practices has increased in the United States, so too have such practices increased in Canada, both absolutely and relatively (Bruce 1994).…”

Organizing Capacities and Union Priorities in the Hotel sector in Oslo, Dublin, and Toronto

“…While in open shops individual workers can choose whether or not to be unionized, closed shop practices imply that workers have to subscribe to a union if an agreement has been made. This has been based on a system of card-based certification (Riddell 2001). The union attempts to make workers sign a card that authorizes the union to represent their interests in collective bargaining.…”