Unionization structure, licensing and innovation

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Endogenous transport price and international R&D rivalry

“…This paper is also related to some studies on R&D activities with vertical structures (Banerjee and Lin, 2003;Manasakis and Petrakis, 2009;Matsushima and Mizuno, 2012;Mukherjee and Pennings, 2011;Mukherjee and Ray, 2007). These studies also have two strands.…”

“…The first strand is on the vertically related market (Banerjee and Lin, 2003;Matsushima and Mizuno, 2012;Mukherjee and Ray, 2007); they consider the process innovation of input suppliers or final-good manufacturers. The second strand is on unionized industry (Manasakis and Petrakis, 2009;Mukherjee and Pennings, 2011); they examine union structures (centralized or decentralized) and firms' R&D activities. In our model, the transporter sets the charge in a manner similar to that employed in the above models.…”

Profit-enhancing competitive pressure in vertically related industries

“…One way to do this is to gain market power through product which the intensive competition caused by the decentralized union structure enhances the total profits of the upstream union. Mukherjee and Suetrong (2007) and Mukherjee and Pennings (2011) discuss whether some factors in upstream competition (e.g., licensing and foreign direct investment) lead to higher profit for an upstream union, while we show that upstream competition can directly increase the profits of upstream firms. 2 Several recent studies have discussed instances where an increase in competitive pressure (the number of firms) may actually increase firm profit.…”

(Local) Wage Settings and (International) Entry Deterrence

“…Authors such as Davidson (1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b), Dowrick (1989), Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2002), Petrakis andVlassis (2000, 2004), Lommerud, Straume, and Sørgard (2005), Kraft (2006), Mukherjee (2010), Symeonidis (2008Symeonidis ( , 2010, Mukherjee and Pennings (2011) and Fanti and Gori (2013) have examined the outcomes of different wage bargaining structures in oligopolies. De Fraja (1993), Dobson (1994) and Banerji (2002) further extend the analysis of sequential wage bargaining in unionized oligopolies.…”