United by Discord, Divided by Consensus: National and Sub-national Articulation in Bolivia and Peru, 2000–2010

Abstract

From 2000 to 2010, Bolivia and Peru underwent similar processes of political decentralization toward the meso level of the government. Three elections later in Peru and two in Bolivia, the ability of national political parties to articulate interests differs markedly between the two countries. Peru tends toward fragmentation with national parties incapable of participating or successfully competing in subnational elections, while in Bolivia, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) – and other parties to a lesser extent – are increasingly capable of participating and winning subnational offices. This paper argues that, despite having undergone very similar institutional reforms, the difference between the cases can largely be explained by two “society-side” variables: the caliber of the political ideas in debate and political social density. The substantive quality of ideas in debate and a greater political social density have been crucial to the Bolivian trend, while their absence has lessened the possibility of anything similar occurring in Peru. In general terms, the article sheds light on the social conditions that favor party-building in a context of decentralization reform.

Political Decentralization and Party Decay in Latin America

“…Subsequently, the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP) intensified the process of municipalization, creating new local governments where none had previously existed (Grindle 2000, 140-141). More recently, Bolivia implemented departmental elections for prefect (governor) in 2005 (Vergara 2011).…”

“…Combating locally based competitors and developing contextualized campaigns proved especially difficult for traditional parties, as they possessed national organizations accustomed to operating with limited local presence (Mayorga 2005). In contrast, parties that emerged following the initial wave of decentralization were better adapted to subnational competition and have used the most recent round of decentralization to their advantage and made further gains, while the traditional parties have continued to decay (Vergara 2011).…”

“…In particular, the indigenous party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), which developed in a post-decentralization context, was organizationally well adapted to subnational competition and blossomed (Van Cott 2005). In 2005, as political decentralization intensified, MAS consolidated a central position in the party system, winning 55 percent of lower house seats and propelling Evo Morales into the presidency (Vergara 2011). The party's adaptive capacity in the face of further political decentralization stems both from its clear ideological program, which facilitated national appeals that transcended local clientelist demands, and from its status as a post-decentralization party, formed partly as a result of decentralization and with an organization better suited to subnational competition.…”

The Impact of Mixed-member Districts on Legislators' Behavior: The Case of Bolivia

“…First among them is the presence of sectorial, regional, and local interests in national politics. Evo Morales and his party, MAS, have been especially successful at bringing together different social movements and sectors, such as coca growers, indigenous groups, miners, and urban associations, and this has shaped the dynamics of parliamentary representation (Vergara 2011). In this regard, it could be expected that both SMD and PR legislators have to focus to some extent on regional and local politics.…”

The politics of extractive governance: Indigenous peoples and socio-environmental conflicts

“…Those authors who focus on political participation assert that socio-environmental conflicts are due to the absence of a party system or representative channels through which contradictory social visions are mediated (Panfichi, 2011;Vergara, 2011). This problem would be worsened in a context of institutional weakness and lack of state territorial consolidation, institutional capacities, long-term policies and consolidated political actors (Tanaka, 2012;Melé ndez, 2012).…”