United Nations Intervention by United Democracies?

Andersson, Andréas

doi:10.1177/001083602762574469

Cited by 23 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…As the United Nations is the driving force behind peacekeeping in the modern world, it should not be surprising that TCCs tend to be those whose foreign policies are most closely aligned with the organization's institutional norms (Andersson 2002). In particular, democratic states, which advocate policies of stability, global peace, and human rights, are generally most likely to join in peacekeeping missions (Perkins and Neumayer 2008), especially when other states that hold such preferences also participate in the operation (Ward and Dorussen 2016).…”

Section: Contributions To Peacekeeping Missionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns

Giray

Chatagnier

2023

Political Research Quarterly

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Peacekeepers play a vital role in enforcing agreements and promoting stability after a civil war, but participation is costly. While troop-contributing countries may appreciate the material and diplomatic benefits that come with performing this task, they also want to minimize the associated costs and potential downsides of the mission. We examine troop contributions in post-civil war peacekeeping missions, determining which countries are most prone to withdrawal and when. Drawing from a domestic audience cost perspective, we argue that those countries that are most exposed to political risk from scandals or fiascoes are most apt to flee, viewing post-war elections as identifiable exit points. Using data on more than 50 peacekeeping operations between 1996 and 2017, we analyze troop contribution dynamics for over 155 different countries to determine whether and when post-war elections prompt peacekeepers to exit. We find evidence that democratic states are more likely either to withdraw completely from UN missions or to reduce their contributions by removing peacekeepers from the front lines in the wake of host country elections.

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Section: Contributions To Peacekeeping Missionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns

Giray

Chatagnier

2023

Political Research Quarterly

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“…Another widely cited factor is the contributor’s political regime. Democracies are found more likely to contribute to UN PKO (Andersson 2002; Duursma and Gledhill 2019; Lebovic 2004; Perkins and Neumayer 2008). However, this statement is not without its challenges, either.…”

Section: Contributing To Un Pkosmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1.For studies at the state level, see Andersson (2002), Gaibulloev et al (2015), Kathman and Melin (2017), Lebovic (2004), and Victor (2010). Examples of mission-level analysis include Boutton and D’Orazio (2020), Bove and Elia (2011), Coleman and Nyblade (2018), Duursma and Gledhill (2019), Passmore, Shannon, and Hart (2018), Perkins and Neumayer (2008) Uzonyi (2015), Ward and Dorussen (2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Examining UN PKO contributions at multiple levels

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Most empirical studies on states’ personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) use a state’s annual contributions as the unit of analysis. A critical problem of the state-level analysis is that it ignores the fact that states have to decide how to distribute these peacekeepers among more than a dozen peacekeeping missions. Ignoring the mission-level decision misses a significant part of states’ UN PKO contributions and could bias our empirical analysis. We propose a two-level model that sees a state’s UN PKO contributions as the interactions between the state-level and mission-level factors. This model is employed to revisit the heatedly debated “reimbursement hypothesis”. Our analysis of the empirical data between 1990 and 2018 shows a mixed relationship between states’ economic development and their UN PKO contributions. We also find that middle-income rather than low-income countries are the most critical providers of UN PKOs since the end of the cold war.

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“…2013). One of the most notable arguments that can be found in early work on the topic is that democratic states are more likely than their non-democratic counterparts to engage in peacekeeping (Andersson 2000, Andersson 2002, Daniel and Caraher 2006, and Lebovic 2004. The normative and institutionalist underpinnings of this claim reflect the emphasis on the shared values, interests and political decision-making processes of liberal democratic states by proponents of the democratic peace theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al 1999, Dolye 2005, Maoz and Russett 1993, and Owen 1994).…”

Section: Participation In International Peacekeeping Operationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political decision-making and the decline of Canadian peacekeeping

Young

2018

Canadian Foreign Policy Journal

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This article explores the reasons behind Canada's declining participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. It proposes a decision-making model that explains how politicians assess opportunities to commit personnel to peacekeeping missions by balancing their policy objectives with the pressures of electoral politics. Emphasizing the importance of voters in political decision-making processes, it argues that participation in peacekeeping is dependent on three key factors: a belief in the value of peacekeeping in principle; a belief in the value of a given peacekeeping operation; and risk aversion in response to the potential costs of peacekeeping. Tracing Canada's declining participation in peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, it particularly focuses on how this calculus has, in different ways, limited Canada's involvement in peacekeeping under Stephen Harper's Conservative government and Justin Trudeau's Liberal government, arguing that the former undervalued peacekeeping as a means of obtaining its foreign policy objectives and as a feature of national identity, minimizing the perceived benefits of participation, while the latter has focused on the inherent risks of peacekeeping despite a professed commitment to peacekeeping in principle, maximizing the perceived costs of further personnel commitments. The decisions of successive Canadian governments have led to a freerider problem in which Canada is willing to enjoy the benefits of peacekeeping but unwilling to bear the costs.

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United Nations Intervention by United Democracies?

Cited by 23 publications

References 35 publications

Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns

Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns

Examining UN PKO contributions at multiple levels

Political decision-making and the decline of Canadian peacekeeping

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