“…Researchers, practitioners, and policymakers have paid close attention to the presence of terrorists and extremists online in recent years, with a particular emphasis on the digital patterns and behaviors of the extreme right (see Conway et al, 2019; see also Holt et al, 2020). It should come as little surprise that researchers have focused on the activities of RWEs on various platforms, including on websites and discussion forums (e.g., Back, 2002; Bliuc et al, 2019; Burris et al, 2000; De Koster & Houtman, 2008; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Holt et al, 2020; Scrivens, 2020; Scrivens et al, 2020b; Wojcieszak, 2010), mainstream social media sites including Facebook (e.g., Ekman, 2018; Nouri & Lorenzo-Dus, 2019; Scrivens & Amarasingam, 2020; Stier et al, 2017), Twitter (e.g., Ahmed & Pisoiu, 2021; Berger, 2016; Berger & Strathearn, 2013; Burnap & Williams, 2015; Graham, 2016), and YouTube (e.g., Ekman, 2014; Munger & Philips, 2022; O’Callaghan et al, 2014), fringe platforms including 4chan (e.g., Finkelstein et al, 2018; Papasavva et al, 2020) and Gab (e.g., Zannettou et al, 2018; Zhou et al, 2019), and digital applications such as TikTok (e.g., Weimann & Masri, 2020) and Telegram (e.g., Guhl & Davey, 2020; Urman & Katz, 2020). But these studies, similar to criminological research on the causes of violent extremism and terrorism in general, lack comparison groups, despite a significant need to focus on comparative analyses and consider how violent extremists are different than nonviolent extremists (Becker, 2021; Chermak et al, 2013; Freilich & LaFree, 2015; Freilich et al, 2015; Jasko et al, 2017; Knight et al, 2019; LaFree et al, 2018).…”