“Unity in Aristotle’s Metaphysics H6”

Abstract

In this essay I argue that the central problem of Aristotle's Metaphysics H (VIII) 6 is the unity of forms and that he solves this problem in just the way he solves the problem of the unity of compositesby hylomorphism. I also discuss the matterform relationship in H 6, arguing that they have a correlative nature as the matter of the form and the form of the matter. IOne recurring theme in the central books of Aristotle's Metaphysics is the unity of substance. This issue is discussed at length in both Z 12 and H 6, and in less detail in several other places (e.g., in Z 17, 1041b11-33 and H 3, 1043b4-14). These two chapters present the scholar with a number of problems: they contain no cross-references and they offer what are apparently differing solutions to the problem of unity. Each chapter also presents its own textual and philosophical problems. On H 6, which will be the focus of this paper, there is virtually no agreement among scholars on any of the major issues that arise. There is, for instance, no agreement on whether the chapter means to address the unity of forms or composites, nor about the nature of Aristotle's solution. But finding answers to these questions is crucial if we are to make sense of the central books of the Metaphysics and their relationship to the rest of the Metaphysics and the corpus. H 6 stands at the end of the two-book work of Z-H, and it addresses issues which have been in play throughoutin particular with the important but difficult issues of the matter-form relationship and the relationship between potentiality and actuality. 1 The latter issue is discus-

Aristotle and Linearity in Substance, Measure, and Motion

“…39 Thus, Hope's (1951, p. 180) use of the phrase 'two aspects of the identical reality', which he uses to translate 'ταῦτὸ και έν᾽ (literally, 'the same and one') at H 6, 1045b 18-19, must be incorrect, for 'aspects' implies that there is only a notional difference between the two. This is the point defended by Keeling (2012), in rejection of what he calls the 'identity model' of unity, and what Galluzzo & Mariani (2006, p. 112 et seq. ) call the 'projectivist' view, associated with Wilfrid Sellars, among others.…”

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z as First Philosophy

“…Aristotle's first move is to argue that the unity of definition depends on the unity of the substance of which it is a definition (1045a12-14). It is controversial whether the ensuing discussion aims to secure primarily the unity of the composite substance (Ross 1924 II, 238;Gill 1989, 139-44;Lewis 1994), or of the form (Harte 1996;Keeling 2012). Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that Aristotle's concern in H.6 is with the unity of substance and definition.…”