2003
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.269797
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Universal Banking and Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from German Initial Public Offerings

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Cited by 12 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 36 publications
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“…This in line with our finding that prestige has negative significant effect to initial return. And according to Klein (2001) underwriter is usually compensated by a commission which is a fixed percentage of the capital raised to minimize underpricing (low initial return). Another independent variable is number of syndicates.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This in line with our finding that prestige has negative significant effect to initial return. And according to Klein (2001) underwriter is usually compensated by a commission which is a fixed percentage of the capital raised to minimize underpricing (low initial return). Another independent variable is number of syndicates.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Capital raised is associated with prestige which can reduce underpricing in the IPO. According to Klein (2001) underwriter is usually compensated by a commission which is a fixed percentage of the capital raised to minimize underpricing, so the capital raised reflects the compensation paid to the underwriters and may also reflect the underwriter"s prestige (Ardiansyah, 2004). According to Kenourgios (2007), underwriter prestige can be a proxy using the ratio of capital which has been enhanced through the IPO process, so prestige can be measured by using the capital raised (CR) with this formula:…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This in line with our finding that prestige has negative significant effect to initial return. And according to Klein, et al [36] underwriter is usually compensated by a commission which is a fixed percentage of the capital raised to minimize underpricing (low initial return). Another independent variable is number of syndicates.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Capital raised is associated with prestige which can reduce underpricing in the IPO. According to Klein, et al [36] underwriter is usually compensated by a commission which is a fixed percentage of the capital raised to minimize underpricing, so the capital raised reflects the compensation paid to the underwriters and may also reflect the underwriter's prestige [2]. According to Kenourgios [17], underwriter prestige can be a proxy using the ratio of capital which has been enhanced through the IPO process, so prestige can be measured by using the capital raised (CR) with this formula:…”
Section: Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Loughran and Ritter (2002) explore the agency conflict between issuer and underwriter and use prospect theory to explain that the greater the recent increase in issuer's wealth, the less is the bargaining effort in negotiations with the underwriter over the offer price. One answer to the question of why issuers do not choose a more efficient selling mechanism like auctions (for example, see Biais and Faugeron (2002)) is the spinning or corruption hypothesis introduced by Loughran and Ritter (2002) (see also the evidence presented in Klein and Zoeller (2003)). Additionally, Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2002) document results that when the overall stock market rally underwriters do not fully adjust the offer price.…”
Section: Theory and Related Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%