Universal languages?: A reply to Moravcsik

Abstract

Existing formulations of liberal theory in International Relations (IR), claimed Andrew Moravcsik in 1997, were 'ideological'. Yet they need not be. A reformulation in line with the requirements of empirical social science could provide a 'nonideological and nonutopian' liberal IRs theory (1997: 513). And this is what he sought to achieve. Moravcsik's empirical reformulation of liberal IR theory, I have argued, did not manage to address the problem of ideology satisfactorily; instead, ironically, it resulted in a deeply ideological formulation of liberal international relations theory (Jahn, 2009). This argument holds Moravcsik in response 'reflects an unwillingness to engage in subtle or sympathetic interpretation' (2010). It misunderstands the logic and requirements of empirical social theory. It ignores abundant literature supporting his position and, worse, fails to provide evidence for its own alternative claims. Its judgments are based on 'methodological or philosophical fiat' (2010). And, couched at the level of abstract reflection, it cannot engage with, and provide solutions for, concrete political problems in world affairs. So wide ranging are these counter-criticisms that they make it appear as if Moravcsik and I must inhabit different planets regarding the aims and requirements of IR as a social science. On Moravcsik's planet, the positivist empiricist method provides a universal language designed to overcome the fragmentation of the field, while on my planet, apparently, relativism rules. On Moravcsik's planet theoretical claims have to be 1 This article is a response to Andrew Moravcsik, 'Wahn, Wahn, Ü berall Wahn': A reply to Jahn's critique of liberal internationalism, International Theory (2010), 2:1, 113-139. I would like to thank the editors of International Theory for instigating this debate and Alex Wendt in particular for shepherding the process so smoothly. Thanks also, of course, to Andrew Moravcsik for picking up the challenge. I also owe him an apology for not sending the first article (2009) directly-I do it now on the second round. And I am grateful to Justin Rosenberg for his comments and suggestions.

Tilting at windmills: a final reply to Jahn

“…In short, I distilled a theoretical claim from the work of John Locke and then provided empirical evidence of its centrality to subsequent liberal political practice. This general procedure does not depart in the slightest from Moravcsik’s own (Jahn, 2010: 145–146).…”

“…Therefore, she says by way of rebuttal, ‘this literature (i.e. Morgenthau, Waltz, Keohane, and Wendt) is not relevant for my argument’ (Jahn, 2010: 4n. ).…”

“…In her latest rebuttal, Jahn simply restates her old ‘straw man’ view 8If…the positivist method adapted to the field of International Relations does not any longer allow a logical derivation of mid-range theories from paradigmatic assumptions, then those general assumptions cannot be tested by comparing the explanatory power of mid-range theories (Jahn, 2010: 144).…”

“…Indeed, as Moravcsik himself points out, under certain circumstances it can be perfectly rational to support imperialism or protectionism. In short, once the connection is loosened, as it is when mid-range theories are not any longer derived from core assumptions but merely consistent with them, this method does not deliver any longer the superior logic and consistency of its original formulation (Jahn, 2010: 142–143).…”

“…What else does paradigmatic distinctiveness mean? (Jahn, 2010). Similarly, if the rationality assumption were doing no work, how could Jahn criticize liberal theory – even if incorrectly – as inherently incapable of engaging in true pan-disciplinary ‘dialog’ because its core assumptions systematically exclude non-rational behavior?12 As is often the case with relativists, Jahn is drawn into contradictions when advancing even the simplest criticisms.…”