Universalism, Particularism and the Ethics of Dignity

Abstract

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense--thus meeting the demands of universalism--but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations--thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance.

Human Non-persons, Feticide, and the Erosion of Dignity

“…Some of that work is more theoretical in nature (Pullman 2002a, b, 2006), while other pieces address particular health ethics issues (Pullman 1996, 1999, 2004a). While I will not rehearse the details of those various discussions here, it will be necessary to provide a general outline of the manner in which I articulate my understanding of dignity in order to inform our discussion of feticide.…”

“…Elsewhere I have characterized the dynamic relationship between basic and personal dignity in terms of ethical and aesthetical values (Pullman 2002a), and have mapped it to the universalism/particularism distinction (Pullman 2002b). For our purposes here we can think of the relationship in terms of form and content.…”

“…On occasion I’ve employed a balloon analogy to illustrate how basic dignity serves as an epistemic constraint on moral discourse, and to capture the dynamic relationship between basic and personal dignity (Pullman 2002b, 2004a) On this analogy the skin of the balloon represents basic dignity, while the contents represent various particularist expressions. Inasmuch as the skin of a balloon is elastic, this epistemic constraint can stretch to accommodate a variety of particularist understandings of what it means to live a dignified life.…”

Can we justify eliminating coercive measures in psychiatry?

“…Human dignity is often used as a central concept in our contemporary moral vocabulary, but both the content of the notion and its basis as a moral category are often left unspecified; there is not enough clarity about the meaning of human dignity 34. There are at least two conceptions of dignity: (1) “inherent dignity” of every human person as a universal and inalienable moral quality which can not be earned and can not be taken away; and (2) “individualistic dignity” that is tied to personal goals and social circumstances, which can be either enhanced or diminished depending upon a variety of circumstances.…”