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AbstractWe study the effect of trading consolidation by examining the response of liquidity and stock price to the exercise of deep in-the-money corporate warrants. This enables a relatively clean test of the value of trading consolidation. The exercise at the warrant expiration is fully anticipated and has no information content. An effect can come from the value of trading consolidation that improves liquidity. Indeed, we find that liquidity and stock prices both increase significantly at warrant expiration. Further, the price increase is positively related to the pre-exercise extent of fragmentation, to post-exercise improvement in stock liquidity, and to the proportional increase in the number of shares following the warrant exercise. *Amihud, yamihud@stern.nyu.edu, Stern . We thank Hank Bessembinder (associate editor and referee) and Jon Karpoff (the editor), for comments and suggestions that helped improve the paper. Financial support from the Israel Institute for Business Research of the Recanati Business School at Tel-Aviv University is gratefully acknowledged.Island is an electronic communication network (ECN) that serves as an electronic marketplace. In 2001, about 20% of NASDAQ volume was traded on Island. 829 This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Sat, 3 Jan 2015 14:27:49 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 830 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis exchange floor. They show that while off-exchange execution is beneficial for brokers, it can result in larger bid-ask spreads and greater price volatility than a consolidated market. Along similar lines, Cohen, Conroy, and Maier (1985) show that in a fragmented market there is a lower chance that an order will find a trading counterpart, an increase in the expected time a limit order has to wait until it is executed, and a wider bid-ask spread. Mendelson (1987) shows that the overall gains from trade decline as the market becomes more fragmented. Thus, theory suggests that fragmentation reduces liquidity. Is the fragmentation of trading actually harmful to liquidity and, consequently, does it lower stock values? The answer is important for the design and regulation of securities markets. This issue took center stage since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pressured the NYSE to relax its Rule 390, which prohibited member firms from executing trades in NYSE-listed stocks off the Exchange floor.2 In 1980, the SEC enacted Rule 19c-3 that allows member firms to trade stocks of...