2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00143.x
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Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions1

Abstract: Despite clear expectations that sanctions busters undermine the effectiveness of economic sanctions, most empirical studies of the phenomenon fail to find that they significantly affect sanctions outcomes. One explanation for these puzzling results is that past studies have almost all relied on Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's (1990) dichotomous, timeinvariant ''black knight'' variable to operationalize the occurrence of sanctions-busting. This piece develops a more nuanced account of how the timing, quantity, … Show more

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Cited by 58 publications
(50 citation statements)
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“…1 For example, Drezner (1999) and Allen (2005Allen ( , 2008 find that sanctions against allies are more likely to succeed, but Drury (1998) and Krustev and Morgan (2011) find no support for this claim, and Nooruddin (2002) and Early (2011) find that sanctions against allies are less likely to succeed for US sanctions. Even when we consider the cost of sanctions, which many see as the most important predictor of sanctions success, the empirical findings are not conclusive (Bonetti 1998;Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003;Nooruddin 2002).…”
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confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…1 For example, Drezner (1999) and Allen (2005Allen ( , 2008 find that sanctions against allies are more likely to succeed, but Drury (1998) and Krustev and Morgan (2011) find no support for this claim, and Nooruddin (2002) and Early (2011) find that sanctions against allies are less likely to succeed for US sanctions. Even when we consider the cost of sanctions, which many see as the most important predictor of sanctions success, the empirical findings are not conclusive (Bonetti 1998;Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003;Nooruddin 2002).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, most findings reported in any one article result from one regression model (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). Even though many scholars conduct tests to ensure the robustness of their findings, these attempts are often Lam (1990) [+], Drezner (1999) [+], Allen (2005) [+], Krustev and Morgan (2011) [0], Early (2011) [−], Nooruddin (2002) [−]…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Hufbauer et al 2007. We rely on this data in part because the construction of some of our independent variables draws heavily on data generated by Early 2009, which also uses Hufbauer et al 2007 The dependent variable is a country's total of FDI inflows from US-based investors, measured in millions of real dollars. These data are provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis's (BEA) statistics division.…”
Section: Dependent Variablementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cortright and Lopez 2000. 12. See Caruso 2003; van Bergeijk 1995 and2009;Hufbauer et al 1997;Early 2009;Biglaiser and Lektzian 2011;andLektzian andBiglaiser 2013. 13.…”
unclassified
“…Accordingly, we assume senders to be more reluctant to target richer countries with a large economy. Earlier research has also emphasized the importance of trade (Early, 2011;McLean & Whang, 2010) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Lektzian & Biglaiser, 2013). Higher trade levels and FDI give more economic leverage to sanctioners but also increase their costs.…”
Section: Sender Costsmentioning
confidence: 99%