Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Fudenberg, Drew; Pathak, Parag A.

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.10.007

Cited by 53 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The design in our Baseline treatment is similar to that in a large number of previous experiments (e.g., Anderson and Putterman, 2006;Bochet et al, 2006;Carpenter, 2007a,b;Gächter, 2000, 2002;Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010;Masclet et al, 2003;Noussair and Tucker, 2005;Page et al, 2005;Sefton et al, 2007). The evidence from these studies indicates that, when altruistic punishment cannot be avenged, free riders are punished frequently.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 74%

Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds

Nikiforakis

Engelmann

2011

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 74%

Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds

Nikiforakis

Engelmann

2011

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…More generally, the subjects themselves may not expect punishment to induce more cooperative behavior. Carpenter et al (2004), Carpenter (2007, Casari andLuini (2009), Fudenberg andPathak (2010), and Noussair et al (2014) conclude that punishment need not be applied instrumentally to increase cooperation and that subjects have preferences for punishing.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The perils of peer punishment: Evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment

Melo

Piaggio

2015

Ecological Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Available online xxxx JEL classification: D03 O12 C93 Keywords: Social disapproval In-group bias Frame field experiment Social preferences Common pool resourceWe provide experimental evidence on the effects of social disapproval by peers among communities of Uruguayan small-scale fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We combined this treatment with an in-group (groups from a single community)/mixed group (groups composed of fishers from different communities) treatment. Our aim is to compare the effects of social disapproval in a context in which individuals exploiting a CPR belong to different communities relative to the case in which only individuals from the same community are allowed to exploit the resource. We find that mixed groups-unlike in-groups-reduce their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment. We do not find any differences in behavior between ingroups and mixed groups when the possibility of being punished is not available. Both in in-groups and mixed groups there is substantial antisocial punishment, which leads to increased extraction of the CPR by those who are unfairly punished. We interpret that the effectiveness of social disapproval is reduced because cooperation was not perceived as the unique social norm. These findings indicate that effective peer punishment requires coordination to prevent antisocial targeting and to clarify the social signal conveyed by punishment.

show abstract

“…Uncertainty affects punishment levels in the PGGs: for example, even if the information about behaviour of group partners (if they cooperate or free ride) is not reliable [17], people still punish, even though their net payoffs decrease [18]. In a peer-punishment PGG experiment, Fudenberg and Pathak [19] demonstrated that individuals contributed more in an ‘observed’ punishment condition (i.e. after each game participants were informed about the punishment points they received), than in an ‘unobserved’ punishment condition (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual differences in behavioural inhibition explain free riding in public good games when punishment is expected but not implemented

Skatova

Ferguson

2013

Behavioral and Brain Functions

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

BackgroundThe literature on social dilemmas and punishment focuses on the behaviour of the punisher. However, to fully explain the effect of punishment on cooperation, it is important to understand the psychological mechanisms influencing the behaviour of those who expect to be punished. This paper examines whether the expectation of punishment, rather than the implementation of punishment is sufficient to prevent individuals from free riding. Individual differences in the punishment sensitivity have been linked to both threat responses (flight, fight, fear system, or the FFFS) and to the response to the uncertainty of punishment (BIS-anxiety).The paper, therefore, examines if individual differences in BIS-anxiety and FFFS can explain some of the variability in free riding in the face of implemented and non-implemented punishment.MethodsParticipants took part in a series of one-shot Public Goods Games (PGGs) facing two punishment conditions (implemented and non-implemented) and two standard non-punishment PGGs. The punishment was implemented as a centralized authority punishment (i.e., if one participant contributed less than their group members, they were automatically fined). Individual contribution levels and presence/absence of zero contributions indexed free riding. Individual differences in behavioural inhibition were assessed.ResultsIndividuals contributed more under the threat of punishment (both implemented and non-implemented). However, individuals contributed less when the punishment was not implemented compared to when it was. Those scoring high in BIS-anxiety contributed more when the punishment expectations were not implemented. This effect was not observed for FFFS.ConclusionSupporting previous research, punishment had a powerful effect in increasing contribution levels in the PGGs. However, when expected punishment was not implemented, individual differences in punishment sensitivity, specifically in BIS-anxiety, were related to fewer contributions (increased free riding) as compared to the situation when punishment was not implemented. This has implications for our understanding of why some people cannot resist the temptation to free ride, even when facing possible punishment for their actions. Our findings suggest that the diminished functioning of mechanisms, associated with trait behavioural inhibition, can partly explain such behaviours.

show abstract

Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Cited by 53 publications

References 26 publications

Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds

Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds

The perils of peer punishment: Evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment

Individual differences in behavioural inhibition explain free riding in public good games when punishment is expected but not implemented

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About