During China’s transition towards land and housing marketization in the 1980s to 1990s, a series of legal and policy arrangements led to the separation of land ownership from land-use rights, followed by the separation of housing ownership from land-use rights. This has institutionally fragmented the housing property rights, allowing properties to be financialized as collaterals. Consequently, the fragmentation of housing property rights inflicts substantial risks on judicial auctions of foreclosed housing. As China’s real estate sector is grappling with a mounting debt crisis, it becomes imperative to enhance the efficiency of judicial auctions to address bank debts and stabilize the housing financial system. By employing the cs-QCA method with a dataset comprising 136 cases of foreclosed properties, this study reveals the critical role of various configurations of property-rights risks in determining the outcome of judicial auctions. Additionally, it identifies the importance of credible commitments offered by the courts in mitigating property-rights risks. The research expects to provide practical and theoretical insights for China’s courts and financial institutions to manage foreclosed properties effectively.