Unpacking Territorial Disputes

Wright, Thorin M.; Diehl, Paul F.

doi:10.1177/0022002714553105

Cited by 42 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 55 publications

(88 reference statements)

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“…This logic is consistent with recent empirical findings from Wright and Diehl (2014) who find that “The willingness of democracies to engage and stand firm in territorial disputes should be greatest when the territory involved is regarded as a public good” (21). For more, see Wright (2014).…”

supporting

confidence: 90%

The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory

Graham¹,

Gartzke²,

Fariss³

2015

PSRM

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Studies of regime type and war show that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but questions remain about why this is the case. A simple, if underappreciated, explanation for democratic success is that democracies fight alongside larger and more powerful coalitions. Coalition partners bring additional material capabilities and may also provide intangible benefits to the war effort, such as increased legitimacy or confidence. Democracies may also find it less costly to join coalitions, as democratic war aims may be easier to apportion among the victors without diluting the spoils. Evaluating our hypotheses in a sample of all wars (or all militarized disputes) during the period 1816–2000, we find that democracies fight alongside larger coalitions and that states fighting alongside larger coalitions are more likely to win major contests. Coalition size subsumes most (and in some specifications all) of the direct effect of regime type on victory.

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supporting

confidence: 90%

The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory

Graham¹,

Gartzke²,

Fariss³

2015

PSRM

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“…Forklaringsproblemet Av alle konfliktspørsmål i internasjonale relasjoner (IR) er territoriale uenigheter de mest brennbare. IR-forskningen har for lengst etablert at grensetvister er langt mer utsatt for krigføring enn andre konflikttyper (Holsti, 1991;Senese & Vasquez, 2008;Wright & Diehl, 2016). 1 Likevel vet vi overraskende lite om når og hvorfor grensetvister plutselig blusser opp.…”

Section: Innledningunclassified

Nettverk-signalisering: en dynamisk modell for taktikkskifter i grensetvister

Schram¹

2020

Internasjonal Politikk

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Når og hvorfor velger stater å bruke militærmakt i grensetvister? Artikkelen argumenterer for at kvantitative studier av grensetvister i internasjonale relasjoner (IR) i for stor grad har fokusert på statiske forklaringsvariabler. For å forstå taktikkskifter må vi isolere hendelsesdynamikker, ikke konstante egenskaper. Paul Huths innflytelsesrike «nettverksmodell» åpner for nettopp dette, men jeg finner at dens logikk er ustø og dens empiriske støtte tvilsom. I stedet foreslår jeg en alternativ mekanisme, inspirert av Barbara Walters borgerkrigteori: En truet stat har et akutt behov for å signalisere kampvilje, og grensetvister er ideelle «scener» for slike signaler. Dermed kan vi forvente aggressive taktikkskifter innad i tvister like etter at eksterne trusler inntreffer – stikk i strid med Huths modell. Jeg tester de to hypotesene på et datamateriale om Kinas konfliktnettverk mellom 1954 og 2005. Mer omfattende tester er nødvendig for å fastslå modellens forklaringskraft, men dette materialet gir ettertrykkelig støtte til mitt argument. Sannsynligheten for at Kina ville militarisere en grensetvist mer enn tredoblet seg i ukene etter at Beijing ble utfordret militært av en eller flere utenforstående stater. Resultatet er uforenlig med litteraturens dominerende tese og styrker dermed oppfatningen av statiske forklaringsvariabler som utilstrekkelige for å kartlegge rykk og napp mellom fred og aggresjon i internasjonale grensetvister. Abstract in EnglishFrom Peace to Fury: Reframing Tactical Shifts in Territorial DisputesWhen and why do states violently contend their territorial claims? I argue that the quantitative literature in IR stands ill-prepared to solve this puzzle due to an endemic appetite for static variables. Territorial disputes escalate because states’ tactics shift; to grasp the dynamic sequences spurring those shifts is therefore critical. Paul K. Huth’s network approach provides a powerful starting point, and I interrogate his hypothesis that threatened states acquiesce in disputes. The inference is both theoretically misplaced and empirically dubious, I find. Yet by injecting the Schellingian logic of ‘commitment-signalling’, drawing on Barbara Walter’s theory of civil wars, I recast Huth’s model: tactical shifts are aggressive, not conciliatory, when states perceive outside threats. I test this antithesis using a sequence-sensitive logistic regression model, employing China’s territorial-dispute history between 1954 and 2005 as a crucial-case experiment. Strong evidence favours this paper’s argument. That has implications for further research. My Network-Signalling model has promise and should be tested more extensively.

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Principles of Conflict Economics

Anderton¹,

Carter²

2019

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Unpacking Territorial Disputes

Cited by 42 publications

References 55 publications

The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory

The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory

Nettverk-signalisering: en dynamisk modell for taktikkskifter i grensetvister

Principles of Conflict Economics

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