Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action

Midler, Estelle; Pascual, Unai; Drucker, Adam G.; Narloch, Ulf; Soto, J. L.

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.006

Cited by 72 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…Narloch et al (2012) found that where self-regarding behavior is the norm, payments based on group performance are more likely to crowd out intrinsic motivations for environmentally friendly behavior while payments based on individual performance appear to crowd in intrinsic motivations. Midler et al (2015) found that ES providers perceived the payment based on group performance as less fair, although this may be different in other contexts (Narloch et al, 2013).…”

Section: Unit Of Controlmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services

Engel

2016

IRERE

188

116

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Payments for environmental services (PES) have become a popular approach to address environmental degradation. However, evidence on its effectiveness is scarce and rather mixed. PES is not a panacea, but there are many cases where PES can be a promising tool. Yet, poor PES design translates into poor performance of the instrument. PES design is a complex task; the devil is in the detail of a number of PES design features. The purpose of this paper is to provide guidance in dealing with this complexity through a comprehensive review of PES design that is accessible to both academics and practitioners. Practitioner guidelines on deciding whether PES is the best approach and for selecting among alternative design features are presented. PES design has to start from a careful understanding of the specific ecological and socioeconomic context. We now know a lot about which design features are best suited to which context. It is time to put these insights into practice. * This paper has emerged from preparing a series of keynote presentations on PES design over the past few years. I thank the participants of these presentations for their questions and feedback. Thanks also to Elisabeth Gsottbauer, Estelle Midler, Sven

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Section: Unit Of Controlmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services

Engel

2016

IRERE

188

116

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…The Cidanau PES appears to match the conditions for successful collective action (Agrawal, 2002) as suggested by Kaczan, Pfaff, Rodriguez, and Shapiro-Garza (2017), whereby the scheme is reinforcing existing governance mechanisms through the use of FGs. Furthermore, Midler, Pascual, Drucker, Narloch, and Soto (2015) explore in the Peruvian Andes that collective rewards may be more sensitive to social factors and have the potential to be less effective. Within the Cidanau PES scheme, we hypothesize that this may not be the case, as the farmers are faced with random compliance monitoring.…”

Section: Engaging With Existing Institutions-contracting At the Gromentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These group members were said to be the "rich men" of the villages, who did not care about the payments. Furthermore, Midler, Pascual, Drucker, Narloch, and Soto (2015) explore in the Peruvian Andes that collective rewards may be more sensitive to social factors and have the potential to be less effective. These social factors, such as social ties and communication were also identified in the Cidanau PES scheme.…”

Section: Engaging With Existing Institutions-contracting At the Gromentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying payments for ecosystem services participants through social or spatial targeting? Exploring the outcomes of group level contracts

McGrath

Leimona

Amaruzaman

et al. 2019

Conservat Sci and Prac

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Participants in payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes can be identified in numerous ways, for example, through social or spatial targeting. However, little is known about how the type of participant targeting will influence the PES outcomes. Using a longstanding PES scheme in Cidanau Indonesia, we evaluate the outcomes of using social and spatial participant identification. The outcomes compared are participant perceptions of equity, understanding, and compliance. This scheme contracts farmers at the group level and has had two implementation phases, the first contracted farmers based on social relationships and the second based on spatial proximity of their plots to reduce monitoring costs. We find that both the social and spatial targeting of participants is perceived as fair, and all participants are complying. Our results thus suggest that the perceived trade-off between efficiency and equity is not ubiquitous and that efficiency gains were made without compromising compliance and perceived equity. We also find that training for the farmer group (FG) leaders is crucial in ensuring that the rest of the FG members understand the PES scheme and its requirements. K E Y W O R D Sefficiency, equity, Indonesia, participation, payments for ecosystem services

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“…For policy recommendations, the relative importance of the two effects depends on the specific context at hand. Future research could look into the various aspects behavioral economists and others have identified to harness peer effects (e.g., Midler, Pascual, Drucker, Narloch, & Soto, ) and how these can be introduced in group‐performance PES schemes.…”

Section: Individual Vs Group Payment Characteristics (Grey Shaded Cementioning

confidence: 99%

On the definition and comparability of individual and group incentives for environmental conservation

Vollan

Hönow

Vorlaufer

2018

CONSERVATION LETTERS

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Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action

Cited by 72 publications

References 73 publications

The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services

The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services

Identifying payments for ecosystem services participants through social or spatial targeting? Exploring the outcomes of group level contracts

On the definition and comparability of individual and group incentives for environmental conservation

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