Unrecognized States: A Theory of Self Determination and Foreign Influence

Abstract

Unrecognized states are characterized by stagnant or crumbling economies and political instability, often serve as havens for illicit trade, and challenge the territorial sovereignty of recognized states. Their persistence is both intellectually puzzling and normatively problematic, but unrecognized statehood can be a remarkably stable outcome, persisting for decades. Our four-player model reveals that unrecognized statehood emerges as an equilibrium outcome when a patron state is willing and able to persistently invest resources to sustain it. We assess options available to actors in the international community who seek to impose their preferred outcomes in these disputes and find that, although sanctions are the most frequently employed, they can often lead to renewed conflict instead of the intended resolution.

Foulweather Friends: Violence and Third Party Support in Self-Determination Conflicts

“…The international community favors status quo stability, the control of the territory by the incumbent state. Buzard, Graham, and Horne (2017) show that third parties should not support self-determination groups unless they have direct reason: imposing costs on the incumbent state, ethnic solidarity, or hope of eventual annexation. The international community wants to avoid violence (2017, 592), investing resources to convince secessionists to cede their demands.…”

“…Buzard, Graham, and Horne (2017) show that third parties should not support self-determination groups unless they have direct reason: imposing costs on the incumbent state, ethnic solidarity, or hope of eventual annexation. The international community wants to avoid violence (2017, 592), investing resources to convince secessionists to cede their demands. Self-determination groups and established governments agree on the importance of external legitimacy through recognition (Stewart 2018; Coggins 2011, 461).…”

“…Following prior work (Buzard, Graham, and Horne 2017; Paquin 2010; Saideman 2001; Grieco 1990), I take stability to be a driving interest for third parties looking on in these conflicts. Ideally, foreign policy decision-making happens in a stable system; stability is the precursor to open trade and diplomatic relations, reliable military cooperation, and the free movement of people and things.…”

Power and Recognition: How (Super)Powers Decide the International Recognition Process

“…History presents us with a few cases of successful nonconsensual secession that resulted in a full international recognition, such as Bangladesh—the only example of unilateral secession without a consent of parent state—Eritrea, East Timor, and South Sudan. Cases that have received wider international recognition but are still de facto and de jure parts of their parent states (e.g., Palestine or the Western Sahara); entities that have obtained de facto independence and international recognition to a wider or lesser degree (e.g., Kosovo, Somaliland, Taiwan, or Abkhazia); and entities that were reincorporated into their parent states by force (e.g., Katanga, Biafra, or Cabinda), and with wide variety of level of external intervention into these conflicts (Buzard, Graham, and Horne ; Ker‐Lindsay ).…”

“…As clearly observable, there are many possible outcomes of the secession. Secession itself is a manifestation of the tension between the principles of self‐determination and territorial integrity outside the colonial context, with the latter usually being the preferred choice of the international community (Buzard, Graham, and Horne , 20; Fabry , 665). In the same way, there are many possible interpretations of these results—be it effectiveness of the unrecognized entity or normative criteria: such clarifications of the outcome of the secession usually struggle to explain many ad hoc decisions in the practice of the international recognition regime (Fabry ) and approaches to different entities.…”