Unsafe Knowledge

Comesaña, Juan

doi:10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7

Cited by 148 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…One might attempt to avoid these results by joining Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004), Comesaña (2005), Baumann (2014) and some others in denying that knowledge truly requires safety. In order for the present point to stand, though, it is enough that a lack of safety preclude knowledge in the cases just described, whether or not it does so in all possible cases that we might imagine.…”

Section: Social Externalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State

Smith¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This chapter is concerned with the claim that knowledge is a mental state—a claim that is often presented as one of the central tenets of knowledge first epistemology. In this chapter, it is argued that this claim carries significant costs that have not been widely appreciated. It is clear that treating knowledge as a mental state leads to externalism about the mental. While externalism is a familiar view to many, it is argued that treating knowledge as a mental state leads to a version of externalism that is, in some respects, far more radical than any version previously considered.

show abstract

Section: Social Externalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State

Smith¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Infelizmente, articular essas objeções adequadamente não cabe no escopo deste ensaio. Para um tratamento destas e de outras objeções às epistemologias modais/contrafactuais, veja Comesaña (2005), e Hiller e Neta (2007). 13 Uma proposta mais recente, porém menos popular, encontra-se em Greco (2012a), cuja teoria é que a relação de atribuição é pragmática.…”

Section: Notasunclassified

Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica

Fett

2017

Principia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature. Pritchard holds that his anti-luck virtue epistemology puts together the correct intuitions from both anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology and avoids their problems. Contra Pritchard, we believe that there is already a satisfactory theory on offer, namely, the defeasibility theory of knowledge. In this essay we intend (i) to examine Pritchard's anti-luck virtue epistemology, and (ii) to defend the defeasibility theory of knowledge as an alternative to Pritchard's theory. We will provide the reader with reasons for believing that the defeasibility theory is better than Pritchard's theory because the former is more economic and more ecumenical than the latter, since it goes without non-epistemic notions and remains neutral as for the internalism vs. externalism debate. Keywords:The Gettier problem; anti-luck epistemology; virtue epistemology; defeasibility theory; Duncan Pritchard. IntroduçãoImagine um sujeito, S, que consulta o seu relógio de parede (analógico) para checar as horas. Por meio da sua percepção, ele passa a crer que são cinco horas, e ele crê verazmente -são, de fato, cinco horas. Até aqui, é plausível supor que a maioria de nós diria que S sabe que são cinco horas. Mas suponha que o seguinte também é verdadeiro neste caso: o relógio de S está parado, e por mera coincidência ele parou há exatamente 12 (ou 24) horas. Aqui, por sua vez, é plausível supor que nenhum de nós diria que S sabe que são cinco horas, embora isto seja verdadeiro e S creia nisso por meio da sua percepção confiável.Por que somos levados a pensar que S não tem conhecimento no cenário exposto acima? Trata-se do famoso caso Stopped Clock, de Bertrand Russell (1948, p.154). Qual é o problema? Muitos epistemólogos prontamente responderiam o seguinte: O problema é a sorte envolvida no alcance da verdade. É por pura sorte que S acaba com uma crença verdadeira sobre o horário, pois é pura sorte que, no momento em que S olhou para o relógio, ele estava parado há exatamente 12 ou 24 horas. Parece a muitos de nós que o conhecimento não pode ser algo tão frágil como é o alcance sortudo da verdade de uma crença. Peter Unger (1968, p.158) sugeriu que esta ideia faz parte da própria explicação do conhecimento. Ele sugeriu que um sujeito, S, sabe que P somente se não é um acidente que S está certo quanto ao que ele crê.Principia 20(2): 179-200 (2016).

show abstract

“…Despite initial appearances to the contrary, the safety condition on knowledge struggles to rule out dangerous Gettier cases as instances of knowledge. To see this, consider the following case from Comesaña (2005) that he brings up as a counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge.…”

Section: Why the Cases Don't Motivate Mixed Accounts Of Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Against Mixed Epistemology

Milburn

2015

Principia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We can call any reductive account of knowledge that appeals to both safety and ability conditions a mixed account of knowledge. Examples of mixed accounts of knowledge include Pritchard's (2012) Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology, Kelp's (2013) Safe-Apt account of knowledge, and Turri's (2011) Ample belief account of knowledge. Mixed accounts of knowledge are motivated by well-known counterexamples to pure safety and pure ability accounts of knowledge. It is thought that by combining both safety and ability conditions we can give an extensionally adequate reductive account of knowledge. In this paper I argue that the putative counterexamples to pure safety and pure ability accounts of knowledge fail to motivate mixed accounts of knowledge. In particular, I argue that if the putative counterexamples are problematic for safety accounts they are problematic for ability accounts and vice-versa. The reason for this, I argue, is that the safety condition and ability condition should be understood as alternative expressions of the same intuition -that knowledge must come from a reliable source.

show abstract

Unsafe Knowledge

Cited by 148 publications

References 4 publications

The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State

The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State

Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica

Against Mixed Epistemology

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About