Untaken Precautions

Grady, Mark F.

doi:10.1086/468143

Cited by 95 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…However, if the assumptions of the standard tort model do not hold, then it is not possible to claim superiority for defining negligence as shortfall from the due care level over defining negligence as existence of a 12 See Grady ( , 1989) on this. However, if the assumptions of the standard tort model do not hold, then it is not possible to claim superiority for defining negligence as shortfall from the due care level over defining negligence as existence of a 12 See Grady ( , 1989) on this.…”

Section: Two Notions Of Negligencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules

Jain

2015

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Section: Two Notions Of Negligencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This view has been most consistently, and cogently, articulated byGrady ( , 1989.2 This chapter draws onJain (2006).…”

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confidence: 95%

Economic Analysis of Liability Rules

Jain

2015

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“…in the domain where both parties take due care. 15 Unfortunately, without imposing more structure of the functional forms, we cannot make a similar claim with respect to the equilibrium choice of activity levels by parties.…”

Section: Property (P1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Efficiency of Comparative Causation

Parisi¹,

Singh²

2010

Review of Law &Amp; Economics

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Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an effect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the efficiency of loss-sharing under comparative causation. JEL classification: K13, K32.

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“…Notes 1 This view has been most consistently, and cogently, articulated by Grady (1983Grady ( , 1984Grady ( , 1989. 2 In addition to denoting the set {x j 0 x 1} by [0, 1], we denote by [0, 1) the set {x j 0 x 5 1}.…”

Section: Acknowledgementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency of liability rules: A reconsideration

Jain

2006

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development

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In the mainstream of law and economics the notion of negligence is defined as the failure to take at least the legally specified due care level. In the standard tort model, with this notion of negligence, the efficient liability rules are characterized by the condition of negligence liability, which requires that if one party is negligent and the other non-negligent then the entire accident loss must be borne by the negligent party. This paper is concerned with the question of efficiency of liability rules when the notion of negligence is defined as failure to take some cost-justified precaution. The main result of the paper shows that there does not exist any liability rule which is efficient when negligence is identified by the existence of some cost-justified untaken precaution.Liability rules, efficient liability rules, notion of negligence, untaken precaution, negligence rule,

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Untaken Precautions

Cited by 95 publications

References 0 publications

Economic Analysis of Liability Rules

Economic Analysis of Liability Rules

The Efficiency of Comparative Causation

Efficiency of liability rules: A reconsideration

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