US Strategies of Institutional Adaptation in the Face of Hegemonic Decline

Abstract

How do shifts in the global distribution of power affect the US' preferences for institutionalized cooperation? This article explains why and when the power shift creates incentives for the US to move cooperation out of universal multilateral institutions, such as the WTO, and into exclusive multilateral institutions where it seeks to create a leading consensus among a select group of 'like-minded' states. An agreement reached within the subgroup imposes costs on those excluded from the deal. This increases the hegemon's power bargaining leverage visa -vis outsiders who can join the new agreement as pricetakers. In this scenario, the hegemon's institutional response to the challenge of rising powers is a strategy of divide and conquer; that is, strategic cooptation based on inducements followed by power bargaining based on coercion. The double move, however, puts the hegemon in the position of challenging the institutional status quo with potentially negative consequences for the original institutional order. A case study of negotiations over a new trade in services agreement (TiSA) shows this strategy of divide and conquer at work as the US tries to first achieve a deal without emerging economies, notably China, that can later be imposed on them. Policy Implications • US global partners should recognize that the US' commitment to inclusive multilateral institutions is likely to decline because of broader shifts in the distribution of power which increase the domestic and international costs of its commitments, and not merely for reasons idiosyncratic to a given administration.

An Assessment of Competitiveness of Technology-Based Startups in India

“…Wu et al ( 2008 ) described firm-level competitiveness as the ability of the firm to optimally deploy and mobilize its assets and capabilities to derive competitive advantage in the market. The onset of COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath resulting in nations increasingly looking to reduce external country reliance in strategic areas (Koleson, 2020 ; Viola, 2020 ) also increase the onus on how technology-based startups can help increase India’s competitiveness.…”

The dynamics of informal institutions and counter-hegemony: introducing a BRICS Convergence Index

“…Russia’s leadership has been essential for launching BRICS, and China’s power advantage enabled it to influence other members to implement its global economic governance reform agenda (Hooijmaaijers, 2021; Katada et al, 2017). The US is already responding to BRICS by engaging ‘like-minded states’ to work around institutions within which BRICS can potentially block US initiatives (Viola, 2020). Vezirgiannidou (2013) frames US support for a permanent seat for India on the UNSC, but silence on one for Brazil, as partly reflecting an effort to ‘split the BRICS’ unity’.…”

Why the world economy needs, but will not get, more globalization in the post-COVID-19 decade

“…The US’ withdrawal from the WHO in the middle of the pandemic, though reversed in January 2021 with the change in presidency, showed that multilateral institutions designed to address global issues are fragile and that they ultimately depend on the will of the largest geopolitical powers to lead international coordination and provide funding and technical expertise. Some scholars have argued that multilateralism – “the institutionalized cooperation […] on the basis of generalized rules and principles, has been a core characteristic of the modern international system” (Viola, 2020 : 30) – was already in decline before the pandemic (Acharya, 2016 ). However, the response to the previous recession that affected a large share of the world economy, namely the 2008–2009 financial crisis, featured a high degree of international policy coordination and a crucial role for both global and regional multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the European Central Bank (International Monetary Fund, 2010 ).…”