Use of land pooling and reconstitution for urban development: Experiences from Gujarat, India

Mathur, Shishir

doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2012.06.007

Cited by 37 publications

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“…Through the interaction of heterogeneous beliefs between farmers and the government, the game of land expropriation will form an evolutionary stable equilibrium.Sustainability 2020, 12, 3367 2 of 21 to non-agricultural uses, mainly through land acquisition by the state [7]. In addition, this kind of land expropriation with public interest is often strongly opposed by farmers and leads to sharp social contradictions [8]. It is also regarded by Upreti (2004) as farmers' struggle to change the unequal social relations of land [9].…”

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The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion

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During land expropriation, it is difficult to form a real antagonistic relationship between farmers and the local Government due to disparities, which means the confrontations between them are difficult to administer. The confrontation between both parties could lead to the distortion of the farmers' resisting logic, who are supposed to be in a vulnerable position. Hence, the farmers are not necessarily in a weak position; sometimes, they even have advantages compared with the local governments. Through the combination of Quiggin's rank-based expected utility theory and evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a conflict-induced game mechanism Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory (RDEU) evolutionary game model and discusses the evolution law of strategic behavior of land-expropriated farmers and local governments under the influence of emotion. The software simulation results show that when the farmers at the weak side think that the probability of the government adopting the strong strategy is higher than a certain cut-off point, the farmers will use the weapon of the weak to release the signal that endangers the order and force the government to adopt a compromise strategy by utilizing authoritative preference for stability. Through the interaction of heterogeneous beliefs between farmers and the government, the game of land expropriation will form an evolutionary stable equilibrium.Sustainability 2020, 12, 3367 2 of 21 to non-agricultural uses, mainly through land acquisition by the state [7]. In addition, this kind of land expropriation with public interest is often strongly opposed by farmers and leads to sharp social contradictions [8]. It is also regarded by Upreti (2004) as farmers' struggle to change the unequal social relations of land [9]. The struggle between land expropriation and land-lost farmers has caused a series of social and economic problems in China, such as the fairness of land expropriation compensation, the conflict of farmland expropriation, and the sustainable livelihood of land-lost farmers [10][11][12][13]. Land expropriation has become a key issue affecting the stability of China's rural areas [14]. However, in these fierce conflicts of land expropriation, we can see that the logic of farmers is to use their own weak identity to fight against state institutions, hoping to meet their own political rights and win social sympathy and support at the same time [15].So, what is the significance of farmers' weak identity as a weapon in the game induced by the conflict of land expropriation? And how does it affect the game equilibrium induced by the conflict? These are problems worth studying.The weapon of the weak is defined as the kind of people who are in a relatively inferior position in psychology, physiology, ability, opportunity, and situation compared with other people in society. When their rights and interests are infringed, using their own symbols of the weak to fight for rights to get the attention of the media or the sympathy and support of social organizations is a way...

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The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion

et al. 2020

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“…The lessened production of sales plots ultimately reduces the land contribution rate of landowners. Further, the availability of financial support from the government and private developers stimulates early development of infrastructure (Mathur, 2013;Turk, 2007). As demonstrated in the practice of LR in Gujrat, India, one essential factor to generate market viability of LR is the early development of infrastructure.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In this situation, even after contributing percentage of land and paying a betterment charge the landowners could eventually acquire immediate monetary benefit due to an increase in the value of their land, induced by infrastructure development. As such, the early development of infrastructure subsequently gives market legitimacy to the landowners (Mathur, 2013;Sorensen, 2000). This apparently motivates to allocate a certain percentage of land for low-income plots.…”

Section: Logic Civil Society Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Examples of the LR model in Europe indicate that local governments often fund infrastructure costs. In Japan, gasoline taxes are used to fund infrastructure (Mathur, 2013). In any context, when the burden of infrastructure costs is lessened in the LR process, this enables the government to use its valuecapture instruments to allocate low-income plots.…”

Section: Logic Civil Society Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Understanding Urban Land Governance through action space: Implications for access to land for low-income housing in managing informal settlements

Shrestha¹

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“…This proportion is estimated to increase to 81% by 2030 (3.95 billion out of 4.9 billion; UNDESA, 2011). Furthermore, developing countries suffer from weak bond markets and property tax systems and centralization of fee and/or tax-based revenue at the state and/or national level (Mathur, 2013). These circumstances have led governments in many countries to seek actively new sources of local non-tax-based revenue, such as the impact fee.…”

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confidence: 99%

Designing an Impact Fee Program to Meet Rational Nexus Principle and Reduce Vertical Inequity

Mathur

2016

Public Works Management & Policy

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This article reviews three impact fee programs spread across three continents (North America, Australia, and Asia) in a search for those impact fee design features that meet the nexus and rough proportionality principles and promote vertical equity. To meet the nexus and rough proportionality principles, we assert that the impact fee should vary by use, intensity of use, and type of infrastructure or service funded by the fee, and that the fee should be based on clearly articulated service standards. Finally, specific policies that may be used to increase vertical equity include (a) allowing developers to pay the fee in installments and/or at a later stage of project development, (b) granting impact fee waivers for affordable housing, and (c) exempting smaller properties from paying the fee.

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Use of land pooling and reconstitution for urban development: Experiences from Gujarat, India

Cited by 37 publications

References 10 publications

The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion

The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion

Understanding Urban Land Governance through action space: Implications for access to land for low-income housing in managing informal settlements

Designing an Impact Fee Program to Meet Rational Nexus Principle and Reduce Vertical Inequity

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Use of land pooling and reconstitution for urban development: Experiences from Gujarat, India

Cited by 37 publications

References 10 publications

The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion

The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion

Understanding Urban Land Governance through action space: Implications for access to land for low-income housing in managing informal settlements

Designing an Impact Fee Program to Meet Rational Nexus Principle and Reduce Vertical Inequity

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Understanding Urban Land Governance through action space: Implications for access to land for low-income housing in managing informal settlements