“…We can still maintain the separation between health conditions '' inferred '' from impairments of function and structure and their resultant activity limitations and participation restrictions, because, even in psychiatry, neither activity limitations nor participation restrictions are logically necessary requirements for making most diagnoses (as Spitzer & Wakefield, 1999, amply demonstrate in their critique of DSM-IV's practice in this regard). Indeed, several empirical studies have indicated that psychiatric symptoms and measures of what ICIDH-2 would call limitations and restrictions tap meaningfully different dimensions of dysfunction, which independently predict a variety of outcomes, including service use and prognosis (Costello, Angold, & Keeler, 1999 ;Costello, Angold, Messer, & Farmer, 1996 ;Green, Shirk, Hanze, & Wasntrath, 1994 ;Hodges & Wong, 1997 ;Hodges, Wong, & Latessa, 1998 ;Lavigne et al, 1998 ;Lyons et al, 1997 ;McArdle & Gillett, 1997 ;Settertobulte & Kolip, 1997 ;Shaffer et al, 1983 ;Verhulst et al, 1993). Maintaining a distinction between diagnosis (usually identified on the basis of impairments of psychological functions) and other dimensions of disability also enables us to investigate the interplay between the two (Ezpeleta, Granero, de la Osa, & Guillamon, 2000 ;Hodges, Doucette-Gates, & Liao, 1999) over time, and from a developmental perspective it is far from obvious that we should expect to see unidirectional causal arrows from disorder to disability.…”