Because cognitive neuroscience researchers attempt to understand the human mind by bridging behavior and brain, they expect computational analyses to be biologically plausible. In this paper, biologically implausible computational analyses are shown to have critical and essential roles in the various stages and domains of cognitive neuroscience research. Specifically,biologically implausible computational analyses can contribute to (1) understanding and characterizing the problem that is being studied, (2) examining the availability of information and its representation, and (3) evaluating and understanding the neuronal solution. In the context of the distinct types of contributions made by certain computational analyses, the biological plausibility of those analyses is altogether irrelevant. These biologically implausible models are nevertheless relevant and important for biologically driven research.The goal of cognitive neuroscience researchers is to uncover the cognitive processes that underlie human intelligence and the human mind, and not to understand any computational entity, per se. Because humans are biological, neuroscience research and its integration into cognitive theory have been the focus of the transition from cognitive science to cognitive neuroscience (see, e.g., . As a relatively new approach, cognitive neuroscience is still in the process ofexploring and establishing the various ways knowledge from differentdomains can becombinedinto a more complete and accurate description of cognition. The foundation and strength of cognitive neuroscience are in bridging knowledge from different and distinct disciplines. As the field progresses in its empirical discoveriesand its theoretical foundations, cognitive neuroscientists are beginning to realize how the integration of different domains can contribute to the overall understanding of the human mind, as This paper was supported by grants awarded by AFRL (Air Force Research Laboratory) to I.E.D. We owe thanks to many people who have read various versions of this paper or who have discussed related issues with us. These discussions about biologically implausible computational analyses in cognitive neuroscience, and perhaps the strong opposition we found to their acceptance, prompted us to write this paper. In particular, we would like to thank Steve Kosslyn, Bill Estes, Randy O'Reilly, Christof Koch, Mike Mozer, Stevan Hamad, and Allan Pantle. We also want to thank Randi Martin, David Adams, William Bechtel, Art Glenberg, and an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments. We need to point out, however, that these people do not necessarily support our arguments (some of them even bluntly oppose them). The ideas expressed in the paper reflect our own viewpoint, and only we carry the responsibility for the arguments and views in this paper. Correspondence should be addressed to I. E. Dror, Department of Psychology, Southampton University, Highfield, Southampton SO 17 I BJ, England (e-mail: dror@coglab.psy.soton.ac.uk; www: http://www.cogsci.soton. ac.uk...