Using Game Theory to Investigate Risk Information Disclosure by Government Agencies and Satisfying the Public—The Role of the Guardian Agent

Umehara, Eiichi; Ohta, Yuichi

doi:10.1109/tsmca.2008.2010796

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In China, strong regulation with environmental taxes has already begun, but the main source of official information for its top-down supervision mechanisms remains rely on the bottom-up incident reporting system (Qi and Zhang, 2014; Wu et al , 2018). However, such mechanism is often prone to frequent pollution data fraud reporting behavior by the enterprises due to information asymmetry, because they believe that they can avoid potential consequences, including top-down accountability and reputation loss (Umehara and Ohta, 2009).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is no doubt that all kinds of pollution problems caused by industrial production are the focus of attention all over the world (Bilen et al , 2008; Cheng and Liu, 2018; Mallin et al , 2015; Shi and Zhang, 2006). Therefore, government environmental regulation becomes a very important and challenging task (Chen and Hu, 2018; Duan et al , 2016; Umehara and Ohta, 2009). Stricter pressure on regulation, boundaries and legislation is thought to have a positive impact on corporate environmental performance (Hafezi and Zolfagharinia, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The integration role of governmental information disclosure platform

Peng

Liu

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check. Design/methodology/approach Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium. Findings The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform. Practical implications The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement. Originality/value Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The integration role of governmental information disclosure platform

Peng

Liu

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, the main official information source for top-down supervision is a bottom-up reporting system of incident information; this information is then reported through administrative channels, level by level, all the way to the central government, which makes it difficult to determine whether limited disclosure by regional officials is occurring during environmental incidents [20]. Thus, regional governments' limited disclosure often occurs as they think that the potential consequences, including top-down accountability and reputation loss, can be avoided by their disclosure-avoidance behaviors [21]. In this case, information disclosure in environmental incidents is facing the "Prisoners' Dilemma" of game theory: the central government tends to choose the unsupervised strategy, and local governments and their officials adopt limited disclosure as their optimal choice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some deficiencies still exist in current studies on information disclosure by governments. Information disclosure is an interactive process among stakeholders, such as enterprises, governments, social media, environmental organizations, and individuals [17,21,45]. Therefore, we can model the interactions among these stakeholders as a dynamic game of information disclosure using game theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, we can model the interactions among these stakeholders as a dynamic game of information disclosure using game theory. For example, Eiichi and Toshizumi used a game model between a government agency and the public to investigate the progress of risk information disclosure [21], but this study mainly considered the game relationship between government agencies and the public, and ignored the conflict between the central government and local governments. When an environmental incident occurs, local governments usually decide whether or not to fully disclose information [4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, social media has had a crucial role in promoting governments to act more responsibly. However, few studies have investigated whether social media use actually leads to increased disclosure during environmental incidents, or how social media influences regional governments’ information disclosure, even though delayed and insufficient disclosure on relevant incidents is often widespread in China. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local governments, and examine the role of social media on game participants’ strategy selections in the information disclosure game. The results indicate that social media plays an active role in promoting the regional government to proactively disclose information during environmental incidents through two mechanisms: the top–down intervention mechanism, and the bottom–up reputation mechanism. More specifically, social media can provide efficient information channels for the central government to supervise local officials’ limited disclosure during environmental incidents, essentially sharing the central government’s supervision costs, and thus improving its supervision and intervention efficiency. Social media helps focus the public’s attention on the limited disclosure of local officials in environmental incidents, and actively mobilizes citizens to protest to maintain their interests, placing considerable pressure on the reputation of local governments.

show abstract

Evolutionary dynamics of health food safety regulatory information disclosure from the perspective of consumer participation

Luo

Chen

Pan

2019

Food Science & Nutrition

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The “trust” attribute of health food has intensified the serious information asymmetry problem in the health food market. Moreover, it has strengthened the formation and influence of potential or hidden safety risks of health food, bringing huge impacts on social harmony and stability. Therefore, this study builds a model of health food enterprise production and operation and government regulatory information disclosure from the perspective of consumer participation. The study fully considers the government's policy burdens and the degree of consumer response to food safety regulatory information. Moreover, it aims to explore the evolution mechanism of food enterprise production and operation strategies and government regulatory information disclosure strategies and analyze the evolution process of the government behavior in health food safety regulatory information disclosure. The theoretical derivation and simulation analysis found that the more sensitive consumers are to health food safety regulatory information, the more significant the profitability improvement of enterprises producing quality health food, thus urging the government to make an objective and comprehensive disclosure of health food safety regulatory information.

show abstract

Using Game Theory to Investigate Risk Information Disclosure by Government Agencies and Satisfying the Public—The Role of the Guardian Agent

Cited by 14 publications

References 12 publications

The integration role of governmental information disclosure platform

The integration role of governmental information disclosure platform

The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

Evolutionary dynamics of health food safety regulatory information disclosure from the perspective of consumer participation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About