Using Paleoclimate Analogues to Inform Climate Projections

Abstract

Philosophers of science have paid close attention to climate simulations as means of projecting the severity and effects of climate change, but have neglected the full diversity of methods in climate science. This paper shows the philosophical richness of another method in climate science: the practice of using paleoclimate analogues to inform our climate projections. First, I argue that the use of paleoclimate analogues can offer important insights to philosophers of the historical sciences. Rather than using the present as a guide to the past, as is common in the historical sciences, paleoclimate analogues involve using the past as a guide to the future. I thereby distinguish different methods in the historical sciences and argue that these distinctions bear on debates over whether the historical sciences can produce generalizations or predictions. Second, I suggest that paleoclimate analogues might actually be considered a type of climate model, and, as such, their use expands on common characterizations of models to include those that are full-scale, naturally occurring, and non-manipulable.

What is Philosophy of the Geosciences?

“… See Bokulich and Oreskes (2017) for a review of models in the geosciences.15 SeeJeffares (2008), though, for some examples of standard experimentation used to test "midrange theories" in the historical sciences.16 We take climate science to be a geoscience, according to the characterization of the geosciences provided in section 2.17 Climate scientists also use other sources of evidence to inform their climate projections, such as information from paleoclimatology(Page, 2021;Watkins, 2023aWatkins, , 2023bWatkins, , 2023cWilson, 2023). More philosophical work needs to be done on these other methods as well as on climate simulations.18 These debates relate to larger philosophical debates concerning the relative importance of accuracy compared to more pragmatic considerations, and the general role of idealizations or falsehoods in model-based science (e.g.,Bokulich, 2009;Elgin, 2004;Potochnik, 2017;Rice, 2021;Wimsatt, 1987).19 This debate harkens back to the different views espoused byLevins (1966) andOrzack and Sober (1993).20 As Leticia Castillo Brache pointed out to us, Fricker's notion is of course not the only available lens for assessing epistemic process asymmetries.…”

“…17 17 Climate scientists also use other sources of evidence to inform their climate projections, such as information from paleoclimatology (Page, 2021; Watkins, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c; Wilson, 2023). More philosophical work needs to be done on these other methods as well as on climate simulations. …”

Paleoclimate Proxies and the Benefits of Disunity

“…Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.1 For philosophical discussion of these so-called "paleoclimate analogues," seeWatkins (2023);Wilson (2023).…”

Models as Dogwhistles

“…For an interesting exception to this trend, seeWatkins (2023) on paleoclimate analogues as full-scale, full-complexity climate models.7 Similarly,Contessa (2010, 215) explicitly notes that scientists make assertions about their models, though Contessa does not claim assertion in a speech-act-theoretic sense of the term per se.…”