Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)

Weiler, Samuel; Gilmore, John F.; Tschofenig, Hannes; Kivinen, Tero; Wouters, Paul

doi:10.17487/rfc7250

Cited by 28 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In the first approach, the two peers own one or more symmetric pre-shared keys [19], and the Client can suggest to the Server which key it intends to use during the Handshake. In the second approach, the peers rely on asymmetric key pairs, and public keys are exchanged either as conveyed in public certificates [8] or as raw public keys [51] generated by manufacturers and installed on nodes before deployment. A node must use out-of-band means for validating raw public keys received from other peers, and usually retains a list of trusted peer identities.…”

Section: Transport Layer Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Flowrider: Fast On-Demand Key Provisioning for Cloud Networks

Paladi

Tiloca

Bideh

et al. 2021

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Section: Transport Layer Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Flowrider: Fast On-Demand Key Provisioning for Cloud Networks

Paladi

Tiloca

Bideh

et al. 2021

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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“…Therefore, authentication is ensured offline or when an out-of-band mechanism binds the public key to the entity/identity which the key represents. To reduce the certificate burden on resource-constrained devices and to increase efficiency, the use of raw public keys for TLS and DTLS has been standardized by the IETF [24]. In addition, even though these schemes require less messaging than certificates and identities, they can only be used for small network scenarios where each node's public key is known in advance to all other nodes.…”

Section: Identity-based Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 99%

Contemporary Physical Clone-Resistant Identity for IoTs and Emerging Technologies

et al. 2021

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Internet of things (IoT) technologies have recently gained much interest from numerous industries, where devices, machines, sensors, or simply things are linked with each other over open communication networks. However, such an operation environment brings new security threats and technology challenges in securing and stabilizing such large systems in the IoT world. Device identity in such an environment is an essential security requirement as a secure anchor for most applications towards clone-resistant resilient operational security. This paper analyzes different contemporary authenticated identification techniques and discusses possible future technologies for physically clone-resistant IoT units. Two categories of identification techniques to counteract cloning IoT units are discussed. The first category is inherently cloneable and includes the classical identification mechanisms based on secret and public key cryptography. Such techniques deploy mainly secret keys stored permanently somewhere in the IoT devices as classical means to make units clone-resistant. However, such techniques are inherently cloneable as the manufacturer or device personalizers can clone them by re-using the same secret key (which must be known to somebody) or reveal keys to third parties to create cloned entities. In contrast, the second, more resilient category is inherently unclonable because it deploys unknown and hard to predict born analog modules such as physical unclonable functions (PUFs) or mutated digital modules and so-called secret unknown ciphers (SUCs). Both techniques are DNA-like identities and hard to predict and clone even by the manufacturer itself. Born PUFs were introduced two decades ago; however, PUFs as analog functions failed to serve as practically usable unclonable electronic identities due to being costly, unstable/inconsistent, and non-practical for mass application. To overcome the drawbacks of analog PUFs, SUCs techniques were introduced a decade ago. SUCs, as mutated modules, are highly consistent, being digital modules. However, as self-mutated digital modules, they offer only clone-resistant identities. Therefore, the SUC technique is proposed as a promising clone-resistant technology embedded in emerging IoT units in non-volatile self-reconfiguring devices. The main threats and expected security requirements in the emerging IoT applications are postulated. Finally, the presented techniques are analyzed, classified, and compared considering security, performance, and complexity given future expected IoT security features and requirements.

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“…The Double Ratchet Algorithm [14] is a cryptographic protocol enabling highly secure, asymmetric message exchange. Originally developed for Signal [20], it is now also used in WhatsApp [22]. It has received significant cryptographic attention and has been formally verified [5].…”

Section: Double Ratchet Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices

Tange

Howard

Shanahan

et al. 2020

Information and Communications Security

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The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol supports a fast zero round-trip time (0-RTT) session resumption mechanism, enabling clients to send data in their first flight of messages. This protocol has been designed with Web infrastructure in mind, and requires these first messages to not change any state on the server side, as it is susceptible to replay attacks. This is disastrous for common IoT scenarios, where sensors often transmit state-changing data to servers. As bandwidth is a huge concern in the IoT, the field stands to benefit significantly from an efficient session resumption protocol that does not suffer from these limitations. Building on the observation that in IoT scenarios the set of clients is often bounded and fairly static, we propose rTLS (ratchet TLS), an efficient 0-RTT session resumption protocol that dramatically decreases bandwidth overhead, while adding forward secrecy and breakin resilience, and is not susceptible against replay attacks.

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Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)

Abstract: This document specifies a new certificate type and two TLS extensions for exchanging raw public keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). The new certificate type allows raw public keys to be used for authentication.

Cited by 28 publications

References 9 publications

Flowrider: Fast On-Demand Key Provisioning for Cloud Networks

Flowrider: Fast On-Demand Key Provisioning for Cloud Networks

Contemporary Physical Clone-Resistant Identity for IoTs and Emerging Technologies

rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices

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