Using Systems Theory to Address Complex Challenges to International Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation

Abstract

Simply looking at a world map suggests new, more complex set of risks and threats will challenge successful international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation operations. Whether related to multimodal transfers of SNF casks or inconsistency in multijurisdictional control measures, international SNF transportation represents a clear example of new threats and risk stemming from a multifaceted, globalized operating environment. In response to recent work out of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) suggesting that new, system‐theoretic analysis techniques better ensure safe, secure and safeguarded international transportation of SNF, this paper explores the ability of basic systems theory concepts—interdependence, hierarchy and emergence—to better understand and address these complexities in system analysis.

Enhancing Early Systems R&D Capabilities with Systems —Theoretic Process Analysis

“…Yet, the large number of probable cyber hazards, however, challenge the efficacy of deterministic approaches. This suggested a need to develop a risk-informed approach to explore possible hazards in digital components and systems in nuclear power plants (Williams and Clark 2019).…”

“…Yet, traditional analysis methods struggle to capture dynamics related to such anticipated challenges as overlaps in risk mitigation responsibilities, conflicting regulatory objectives, increases in transfers between transportation modes, and multi-Table 2. Summary of STPA-generated states of increased risk for a representative set of control actions for international SNF transportation, from Williams (2018) STPA Hazard Types: NNP = "needed, not provided"; PNN = "provided, not needed"; Too early = "provided tool early" Subscripts denote a particular conditional description for a violated control action aligned with a given state of increased risk ple geopolitical or maritime border crossings. In response, a research project was initiated to explore an analytical solution capable of evaluating challenges to safety (for example, preventing an accidental radiological release), security (for example, protecting against intentional malicious acts) and safeguards (for example, averting state-sponsored diversion of nuclear material) of spent nuclear fuel transportation (Williams 2018).…”