Using the Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game

Gunnthorsdottir, Anna; McCabe, Kevin; Smith, Vernon L.

doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(01)00067-8

Cited by 364 publications

(253 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Previous findings have revealed that a negative relationship exists between trustworthiness and Machiavellianism [40,63]. Moreover, those who score high in Machiavellianism are more likely to defect in a bargaining game [64].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

When Emotional Intelligence Affects Peoples’ Perception of Trustworthiness

Lee¹,

Selart²

2015

TOPSYJ

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By adopting social exchange theory and the affect-infusion-model, the hypothesis is made that emotional intelligence (EI) will have an impact on three perceptions of trustworthiness -ability, integrity and benevolence -at the beginning of a relationship. It was also hypothesized that additional information would gradually displace EI in forming the above perceptions. The results reveal that EI initially does not contribute to any of the perceptions of trustworthiness. As more information is revealed EI has an impact on the perception of benevolence, but not on the perceptions of ability and integrity. This impact was observed to be negative when the nature of the information was negative. On the other hand, information alone was shown to have a significant impact on the perceptions of ability and integrity, but not on the perception of benevolence. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are addressed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

When Emotional Intelligence Affects Peoples’ Perception of Trustworthiness

Lee¹,

Selart²

2015

TOPSYJ

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“…When one player applies his best response f i , Nash equilibria require that other player identifies the same prediction function for producing the output of the game under conditions of consistent alignment of beliefs (that avoids false beliefs given in Definition 4.4) as a fixed point of f i . 30 Thagard [68] gives one of the earliest accounts of the role of second order meta analysis, especially regarding the cognitive processes involved in deception. Thagard is credited with the view that these meta models with recursion required "very little extra representation (space/memory) due to the necessary assumption that the opponent has (roughly) the same cognitive abilities as oneself", MacInnes [41].…”

Section: Type 4 Dynamics and Innovations By Digital Agents 273mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…al. [30] have found evidence that high 'Mach' types who seem better equipped to conceive of deceit are also likely to deliver Nash equilibrium outcomes in well-known trust games.…”

Section: Type 4 Dynamics and Innovations By Digital Agents 273mentioning

confidence: 99%

Complex Type 4 Structure Changing Dynamics of Digital Agents: Nash Equilibria of a Game with Arms Race in Innovations

Markose

2016

SSRN Journal

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Abstract. The new digital economy has renewed interest in how digital agents can innovate. This follows the legacy of John von Neumann dynamical systems theory on complex biological systems as computation. The Gödel-Turing-Post (GTP) logic is shown to be necessary to generate innovation based structure changing Type 4 dynamics of the Wolfram-Chomsky schema. Two syntactic procedures of GTP logic permit digital agents to exit from listable sets of digital technologies to produce novelty and surprises. The first is meta-analyses or offline simulations. The second is a fixed point with a two place encoding of negation or opposition, referred to as the Gödel sentence. It is postulated that in phenomena ranging from the genome to human proteanism, the Gödel sentence is a ubiquitous syntactic construction without which escape from hostile agents qua the Liar is impossible and digital agents become entrained within fixed repertoires. The only recursive best response function of a 2-person adversarial game that can implement strategic innovation in lock-step formation of an arms race is the productive function of the Emil Post [58] set theoretic proof of the Gödel incompleteness result. This overturns the view of game theorists that surprise and innovation cannot be a Nash equilibrium of a game.

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“…A machiavellista személyek cinikusak, opportunisták, jó stratégiai képességgel rendelkeznek. Igen gyanakvóak, bizalmatlanok más emberekkel szemben és inkább a rövid távú kapcsolatokat preferálják (GUNNTHORSDOTTIR, MCCABE, SMITH, 2002). Nem jellemző rájuk a közösségben való gondolkodás, úgy vélik, mielőtt kihasználná őket valaki, inkább ők használják ki a másikat (WILSON, NEAR és MILLER, 1998).…”

Section: A Machiavellizmus Fogalma a Pszichológiábanunclassified

A machiavellisták érzelmi intelligenciája társas interakcióban

Orosz¹,

Bereczkei²

2015

MPSzle

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Using the Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game

Cited by 364 publications

References 43 publications

When Emotional Intelligence Affects Peoples’ Perception of Trustworthiness

When Emotional Intelligence Affects Peoples’ Perception of Trustworthiness

Complex Type 4 Structure Changing Dynamics of Digital Agents: Nash Equilibria of a Game with Arms Race in Innovations

A machiavellisták érzelmi intelligenciája társas interakcióban

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