Using type enforcement to assure a configurable guard

Greve, Peter; Hoffman, John D.; Smith, Richard E.

doi:10.1109/csac.1997.646187

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Throughout the paper it has been necessary to treat a n.pay output as being on a trusted path, that is, any component generating n.pay has to be reliable. In practice, if we know that only one message can be output at the end of an assured pipeline (as in [9]), then we could regard the P3-make-payment program (Example 8) as a potentially unreliable filter or integrity verification procedure (IVP), whose failure cannot result in the generation of multiple n.pay outputs.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evaluating system integrity

Foley

1998

Proceedings of the 1998 Workshop on New Security Paradigms

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Conventional models of system integrity tend to be implementation-oriented in that they define integrity in terms of specific controls such as separation of duties, wellformed transactions, and so forth. In this paper we propose a formal definition of integrity that is based on the notion of dependability and is implementation independent. Using a series of examples, we argue that separation of duties, assured pipelines, fault-tolerance, and cryptography may be viewed as implementation techniques for achieving integrity.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Failure of program P3 can result in multiple payments and therefore it is necessary to treat the payment program P3 as a reliable component. This is not an unreasonable assumption: for example, a typical guard pipeline regards that part that generates the output as trusted [9]. Thus, the infrastructure is modelled as …”

Section: Security Kernelsmentioning

confidence: 99%