2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.07.001
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Using uncensored communication channels to divert spam traffic

Abstract: We offer a microeconomic model of the two-sided market for the dominant form of spam: bulk, unsolicited, and commercial advertising email. We adopt an incentive-centered design approach to develop a simple, feasible improvement to the current email system using an uncensored communication channel. Such a channel could be an email folder or account, to which properly tagged commercial solicitations are routed. We characterize the circumstances under which spammers would voluntarily move much of their spam into … Show more

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Cited by 1 publication
(1 citation statement)
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“…Given a greater likelihood that a recipient will claim a spammer's bond, and appropriately selecting the size of the bond, the cost for a good sender to signal its belief that the recipient wants to see its mail will be sufficiently lower that they will be willing to comply and send email, whereas bad senders will be discouraged. Chiao and MacKie-Mason [2006] addressed the email spam pollution problem from a somewhat different perspective. They show conditions under which offering an alternative, even lower-cost (and higher-quality) platform for advertisers to distribute their spam might induce enough diversion of advertising to the alternative channel, simultaneously lowering the value of the regular email channel for other spammers, so that in equilibrium most or all spam will move to the advertising ("open") channel.…”
Section: Spam Emailmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given a greater likelihood that a recipient will claim a spammer's bond, and appropriately selecting the size of the bond, the cost for a good sender to signal its belief that the recipient wants to see its mail will be sufficiently lower that they will be willing to comply and send email, whereas bad senders will be discouraged. Chiao and MacKie-Mason [2006] addressed the email spam pollution problem from a somewhat different perspective. They show conditions under which offering an alternative, even lower-cost (and higher-quality) platform for advertisers to distribute their spam might induce enough diversion of advertising to the alternative channel, simultaneously lowering the value of the regular email channel for other spammers, so that in equilibrium most or all spam will move to the advertising ("open") channel.…”
Section: Spam Emailmentioning
confidence: 99%