Because views on relational database systems mathematically define arbitrary sets of stored and derived data, they have been proposed as a way of handling context-and contenbdependent classification, dynamic classification, inference, aggregation, and sanitization in multilevel database systems. This paper describes basic view concepts for a multilevelsecure relational database model that addresses the above issues. The model treats stored and derived data uniformly within the database schema. All data in the database is classified according to views called classification constraints, which specify security levels for related data. In addition, views called aggregation constraints specifies classifications for aggregates that are classified higher than the constituent elements. All data accesses are confined to a third set of views called access views, which higher than their declared 1.Introduction filter out all data classified view level.The objective of this paper is to describe basic view concepts for a multilevel-secure relational database model. The model is being developed as part of three-year project to design a system that will meet the criteria for class A1l. The project goals include producing a security policy, formal model, formal top level specifications, and implementation specifications.The concept of secure views originated in IBMs System R database system (now called SQL/DS), which was inspired by Codd's fundamental work on relational databaaes2. System R introduced a view as a stored or derived relation expressed in the query language SQL. It then tied its access control mechanism to views by making views the objects of authorization (see also Date' and Dennings). The rationale for this decision was that views, being at a CH2292-l/861X100/01 56$01.0001986IEEE higher level of abstraction than the physical data, simplify the spectlcation and enforcement of contextand content-dependent constraints. For the same reason, Stonebraker6 adopted a high-level approach in the INGRES relational system, though the strategy there uses query modification rather than views. The model we will describe uses features from both System R and INGRES.
Concurrent with the development work at IBM, Neumann obsewed that views provided an attractive method for implementing a secure relational data management system on top of SRI's Provably Secure Operating System (PSOS)7. In the PSOS approach, a view is restricted to a subset of a single relation and serves as a capability for selective access to the relation.Neither the IBM nor SRI projects addressed the issues that would be raised if views were used to classify data and enforce mandatory security. Proposals to use secure views as a basis for multilevelsecure database systems were independently made by Clay brook8 and by Denning", who at that time was helping to organize the 1982 Woods Hole Summer Study on Multilevel Database Management Security sponsored hy the National Academy of Sciences, Air Force Studies Board. Denning observed that because views can define arbitr...