Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people? Harming animals and humans for the greater good.

Abstract

Most people hold that it is wrong to sacrifice some humans to save a greater number of humans. Do people also think that it is wrong to sacrifice some animals to save a greater number of animals, or do they answer such questions about harm to animals by engaging in a utilitarian cost-benefit calculation? Across 10 studies (N = 4,662), using hypothetical and real-life sacrificial moral dilemmas, we found that participants considered it more permissible to harm a few animals to save a greater number of animals than to harm a few humans to save a greater number of humans. This was explained by a reduced general aversion to harm animals compared to humans, which was partly driven by participants perceiving animals to suffer less and to have lower cognitive capacity than humans. However, the effect persisted even in cases where animals were described as having greater suffering capacity and greater cognitive capacity than some humans, and even when participants felt more socially connected to animals than to humans. The reduced aversion to harming animals was thus also partly due to speciesism-the tendency to ascribe lower moral value to animals due to their species-membership alone. In sum, our studies show that deontological constraints against instrumental harm are not absolute but get weaker the less people morally value the respective entity. These constraints are strongest for humans, followed by dogs, chimpanzees, pigs, and finally inanimate objects.

Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do

“…Previous studies have suggested that adults exhibit speciesism (Caviola et al, 2019). For example, adults value humans more than animals even in cases in which humans have equal or lower cognitive capacities than animals (Caviola et al, 2020). Thus, one possible explanation of our findings is that children are far less speciesist than adults.…”

“…This is sometimes referred to as speciesism —a term from philosophy that frames our attitude toward animals as a prejudice analogous to sexism or racism (Singer, 1975). In support of the speciesism hypothesis, studies have shown that factors such as the lesser mental capacities of animals play only a partial role in explaining our preference for humans (Caviola et al, 2020). For example, in cases in which humans with severe cognitive impairment have capacities equivalent to or even lower than some animals, people will nonetheless still value humans more than animals.…”

Making utilitarian choices but giving deontological advice.

“…The significant self-advice difference between dilemmas containing human lives versus nonhuman lives could be evidence that self-choice and advisor participants weigh information differently. Recently, Caviola and colleagues (2021) found support for a multilevel weighted deontology model , which indicates that deontological weights change according to an individual’s perceived moral standing. Of import, humans are thought to have higher moral standing than nonhumans (Caviola et al, 2019); therefore, in response to the moral dilemmas, advisors may be applying different deontological weights for humans and nonhumans in a possibly lexicographic manner, by associating greater deontological weight when deciding for humans and comparatively little for nonhumans.…”

The Psychology of (In)Effective Altruism

“…Donors in the developed world, for example, prefer local over foreign charities although charities working in distant poor countries tend to be more effective [13,[25][26][27]. Second, there is biological distance: most people prefer to help humans over animals, even when controlling for perceived cognitive capacity and capacity for suffering [28,29]. The tendency to favor humans over animals is a stable trait that correlates with tendencies that are widely regarded as biases (e.g., racism, sexism) and is reflected in donation behavior (helping humans vs animals) [28].…”