Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality

Ashford, Elizabeth

doi:10.2307/2678423

Cited by 42 publications

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“…1 1 The concern for taking non‐ideal theory seriously is gaining momentum in recent philosophical literature. See, for example, John Gray (1995), George Sher (1997), Jonathan Wolff (1998), Elizabeth Anderson (1999), Elizabeth Ashford (2000; 2003), David Miller (2001), Liam Murphy (2000), Samuel Scheffler (2001), Stuart White (2003) and Barbra Fried (2004). …”

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confidence: 99%

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

Farrelly

2007

Political Studies

438

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In this article I argue that theorizing about justice at the level of ideal theory is inherently flawed and thus has impoverished liberal egalitarianism. Ideal theorists (falsely) assume that a political philosopher can easily determine (or has privileged access to) what constitutes the ‘best foreseeable conditions’. Furthermore, by assuming full compliance, ideal theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia. More specifically I argue that liberal egalitarians who function at the level of ideal theory adopt a cost‐blind approach to rights and a narrow view of possible human misfortune. The former issue leads liberal egalitarians to give priority to a serially ordered principle of equal basic liberties or to treat rights as ‘trumps’; and the latter to a stringent prioritarian principle (Rawls' difference principle) or luck egalitarianism. Taken together, the cost‐blind approach to rights, coupled with the narrow view of human misfortune, mean the liberal egalitarian theories of justice cannot address the issue of trade‐offs that inevitably arises in real non‐ideal societies that face the fact of scarcity. This makes liberal egalitarianism an ineffective theory of social justice.

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confidence: 99%

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

Farrelly

2007

Political Studies

438

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“…Parallel concerns about individuals being expected to shoulder unjustifiably high moral burdens due to others’ neglect of their obligations also arise in discussions of Bernard Williams's famous argument that utilitarianism violates personal integrity . Elizabeth Ashford points out that it would seem unjust if a very stringent duty of general beneficence required some people to give up deeply valued personal commitments in order to make amends for the moral complacency of others, if others were contributing nothing at all to such assistance efforts …”

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confidence: 99%

Practitioner Courage and Ethical Health Care Environments

Oakley¹

2015

Hastings Center Report

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In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Ann Hamric, John Arras, and Margaret Mohrmann highlight how contemporary accounts of the virtue of courage in health care often gloss over deeper problems in the underlying health care systems themselves. They express particular concerns about the appropriateness and personal costs of exhortations to health professionals to take courageous action in circumstances where this is “required only because of unethical institutional structures” (p. 39). They offer valuable points that are not adequately recognized in discussions of courage as a professional virtue in health care practice. The call for more judicious appeals to health professionals to exercise courage in health care practice should clearly be heeded. A sole reliance on practitioner courage for exposing unethical workplace practices would be misguided. Nevertheless, there is still a legitimate place for encouraging health professionals to develop and act on courage.

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“…10 10 Anticipations of, or variations on, this point are found in Halfon (1989); Ashford (2000); Cox et al. (2003, 2008); Graham (2001). …”

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confidence: 97%

“…2 2 Rawls (1971); Harris (1974); McKinnon (1991); Schauber (1996); Ashford (2000); Ridge (2001); Scherkoske (2010) give reasons for scepticism. …”

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Whither Integrity I: Recent Faces of Integrity¹

Scherkoske

2013

Philosophy Compass

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Despite the fact that most of us value integrity, and despite the fact that we readily understand one another when we talk and argue about it, integrity remains elusive to understand. Considerable scholarly attention has left troubling disagreement on fundamental issues: Is integrity in fact a virtue? If it is, what is it a virtue of? Why exactly should we value integrity? What is the appropriate way to have concern for one’s own integrity? Is having integrity compatible with having significant moral flaws? After an overview of common ‘data points’ or platitudes concerning integrity, this article outlines six distinct views of integrity that have been defended and draws attention to problems each has accommodating these data points.

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Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality

Cited by 42 publications

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Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

Practitioner Courage and Ethical Health Care Environments

Whither Integrity I: Recent Faces of Integrity¹

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Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality

Cited by 42 publications

References 0 publications

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

Practitioner Courage and Ethical Health Care Environments

Whither Integrity I: Recent Faces of Integrity1

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Whither Integrity I: Recent Faces of Integrity¹