Utility-Optimal Partial Spectrum Leasing for Future Wireless Services

Abstract

One of the challenges facing the next-generation wireless networks is to cope with the expected demand for data. This calls for an efficient spectrum regulation that can enable mobile subscribers to support high quality of service (QoS) and mobile network operators (MNOs) to leverage their profit streams. In this paper, we present a new spectrum allocation policy in a monopoly situation. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. We show that the conventional spectrum leasing contract may lead to the unprecedented scenario in which costs outweigh their revenues. On the other hand, our proposed spectrum leasing contract can not only maximize user welfare but also leverage MNO's profit streams. We show that our spectrum leasing contract can increase user welfare and MNO's profit up to 75% and 20%, respectively, relative to the conventional spectrum leasing contract. Thus, regulators must rewrite their spectrum allocation policy in order to maximize user welfare and leverage MNO's profit streams.

Game-Theoretic Understanding of Price Dynamics in Mobile Communication Services

“…We analyze mobile communications markets using Cournot and Bertrand competition models [15]- [18]. In [15]- [17], we suggest spectrum policies and subsidization schemes for improving user welfare in mobile communications. In [18], we investigate the effect of allocation of asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks on mobile communications markets.…”

Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services

“…Extending this work, it would be useful to propose some methodologies for setting reserve prices [19], [20]. Second, we could consider an oligopoly market where multiple MNOs initially have different market share before spectrum allocation, where our current research is heading.…”