Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules

Vickrey, William

doi:10.2307/1884349

Cited by 301 publications

(74 citation statements)

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“…There again, the author was perfectly aware of the issues, and in fact devoted a section (Section 11.3, pages 192 and on) to discuss the speci…c question of sincere preference revelation. Sen's discussion is in line with those authors, like Vickrey (1960) and Murakami (1968) who discussed the importance of speci…c requirements on social choice procedures in order to control the extent of manipulation. Sen was aware of the technical di¢ culty involved in …nding conditions that eliminate all possibilities for manipulation.…”

Section: Introduction a Few Historical Notessupporting

confidence: 70%

“…One of the intriguing aspects in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result is that, even before it was formally proven, some authors did establish its close connection with Arrow's impossibility theorem (Vickrey (1960)). Satterthwaite (1975), and Kalai and Muller (1977) went a long way in establishing this connection (I elaborate further on this point in Section 10.1).…”

Section: The Gibbard-satterthwaite Theorem As a Corollarymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There will still be some mention to them in speci…c contexts where the boundaries are hard to establish, as in the analysis of assignment and cost sharing models (see Sections 9.3 and 9.4. But I exclude very important and extensive work on public goods allocation, in the line of Vickrey (1960), Groves (1973), Groves and Loeb (1975), Green and La¤ont (1979), or Roberts (1979), and also ignore the very relevant subject of auctions, where economists and, more recently, computer scientists as well, have examined a host of questions related to incentives, in general, and to strategy-proofness in particular.…”

Section: The Search For Strategy-proofness: An Outlinementioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategyproof Social Choice

Barberà¹

2011

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

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Section: Introduction a Few Historical Notessupporting

confidence: 70%

Section: The Gibbard-satterthwaite Theorem As a Corollarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Search For Strategy-proofness: An Outlinementioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategyproof Social Choice

Barberà¹

2011

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

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“…Our approach differs in several respects from related contractarian models proposed by Vickrey (1945Vickrey ( , 1960 and Harsanyi (1953Harsanyi ( , 1975 on the one hand and Rawls (1971) on the other hand. First of all, besides our emphasis on innovativeness, our model of the constitutional decision-making calculus does not include a representative agent, but rather a multitude of heterogenous agents.…”

Section: Constitutional Preferences and Risk Attitudes: The Case Of Pmentioning

confidence: 95%

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

Witt¹,

Schubert²

2008

Const Polit Econ

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In constitutional political economy, the citizens' constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interests are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens' constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.

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“…Vickrey (1945Vickrey ( , 1960 and Harsanyi (1955) derived their particular form of utilitarianism from the need to consider risky consequences. And one obviously wants a theory of social choice that is applicable to decisions in the face of risk.…”

Section: Random Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons

Hammond

1991

Soc Choice Welfare

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Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition makes social choice depend only on personal rather than interpersonal comparisons of relevant social states, and so leads to dictatorship. Instead, a new "independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons" (IIIC) condition allows anonymous Paretian social welfare functionals such as maximin and Sen's "leximin," even with an unrestricted preference domain. But when probability mixtures of social states are considered, even IIIC may not allow escape from Arrow's impossibility theorem for individuals' (ex-ante) expected utilities. Modifying IIIC to permit dependence on interpersonal comparisons of relevant probability mixtures allows Vickrey-Harsanyi utilitarianism. -Hildreth (1953, p. 91) Journal of Economic Literature classfication: 025 IRRELEVANT INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS

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Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules

Cited by 301 publications

References 0 publications

Strategyproof Social Choice

Strategyproof Social Choice

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

Independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons

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