V-Expressing Credences

Rothschild, Daniel

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00327.x

Cited by 50 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…presuppositions can be filtered by material to their left, but not by material to their right). Following recent work, we argue that the evidence, however, is much less clear than is commonly accepted once we take into account independent issues about redundancy (Schlenker 2009;Rothschild 2011;Chemla & Schlenker 2012). Similarly, intuitions about right-to-left filtering in conjunction are muddied by the possibility of presupposition suspension.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…1 See Schlenker 2008aFox 2008;Rothschild 2011;Chemla & Schlenker 2012;Mandelkern & Romoli 2017b for discussion. We will use 'left-to-right' or 'right-to-left' to describe the potential order effects; for discussion as to whether these effects should be thought of as being based on linear or hierarchical order see Romoli & Mandelkern 2016;Chung 2017;Chierchia 2009;Ingason 2016;George 2008; see also the Conclusion section below.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Asymmetry in presupposition projection: The case of conjunction

Mandelkern¹,

Zehr

Romoli

et al. 2017

SALT

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Is the basic mechanism behind presupposition projection fundamentally asymmetric or symmetric? This is a basic question for the theory of presupposition, which also bears on broader issues concerning the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these simply rooted in superficial asymmetries of language uselanguage use unfolds in time, which we experience as fundamentally asymmetricor can they be, at least in part, directly referenced in linguistic knowledge and representations? In this paper we aim to make progress on these questions by exploring presupposition projection across conjunction, which has typically been taken as a central piece of evidence that presupposition projection is asymmetric. As a number of authors have recently pointed out, however, whether or not this conclusion is warranted is not clear once we take into account independent issues of redundancy. Building on previous work by Chemla & Schlenker (2012) and Schwarz (2015), we approach this question experimentally by using an inference task which controls for redundancy and presupposition suspension. We find strong evidence for left-to-right filtering across conjunctions, but no evidence for right-to-left filtering, suggesting that, at least as a default, presupposition projection across conjunction is indeed asymmetric.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetry in presupposition projection: The case of conjunction

Mandelkern¹,

Zehr

Romoli

et al. 2017

SALT

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“…And this yields a restricted form of nonfactualism about the state of knowing itself. 26 And both employ the notion of an information state:…”

Section: Closingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…27 For independent motivation of various aspects of the above semantics and further discussion, see [10,15,22,25,26,35,37,38], . 28 For extensions to attitude verbs, see [26,35,38]. Anand and Hacquard [1] contains additional relevant discussion.…”

Section: Probabilistic Static Semanticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

Yalcin

2012

J Philos Logic

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This paper defends a counterexample to Modus Tollens, and uses it to draw some conclusions about the logic and semantics of indicative conditionals and probability operators in natural language. Along the way we investigate some of the interactions of these expressions with knows, and we call into question the thesis that all knowledge ascriptions have truthconditions. A probabilistic dynamic semantics for probability operators, conditionals, and acceptance attitudes is developed around the idea of representing the common ground of a conversation as a set of probability spaces.

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“…Rothschild (2012) argues that in the case of the probably operator, we actually need sets of probability functions in order to handle a puzzle about disjunctions of probably sentences. The puzzle is that there are true disjunctions of the form probably φ ∨ probably ψ where neither disjunct is true.…”

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confidence: 99%

Subjective Ought

Carr¹

2015

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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T his paper concerns the subjective ought in natural language. If you think the apple is poisoned, there's a sense in which you ought not eat the appleeven if, unbeknownst to you, the apple isn't poisoned. This ought, the subjective ought, isn't just sensitive to sources of value in the world: it's also sensitive to what information is available. The objective ought, by contrast, is insensitive to knowledge and ignorance: it's the ought from a God's-eye view.The subjective and objective ought and related expressions (should, arguably must and have to, attitude verbs like want and need, comparatives like better, and so on) aren't technical terms in philosophy. They are a part of natural language, the language we use to express intuitions in ethics, philosophy of action, and decision theory. When we investigate the relations between what we ought to do and considerations like what morality or prudence requires, what we want or intend, what we're able to do, and so on, our claims are expressed in natural language. They reflect the logical structure of natural language. And our theorizing often tacitly makes assumptions about the entailment relations between various considerations and what we ought to do.So we should get clear on how ought and related expressions work in natural language. The subjective ought, in particular, is not well understood. The recent literature on the Miners Puzzle, initiated by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and developed by Charlow (2013), Cariani, Kaufmann, and Kaufmann (2013), Dowell (2012), von Fintel (2012, and Silk (2014a), discredits a widespread misconception about the subjective ought: that ought claims in natural language must obey classical inference rules like modus tollens. In fact, subjective ought provides a wealth of examples that show that those rules aren't valid. In Section 1, I summarize Kolodny and MacFarlane's argument that indicative conditionals don't obey modus ponens, and I provide some new empirical and theoretical arguments against the validity of classical inference rules for natural language conditionals.

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V-Expressing Credences

Cited by 50 publications

References 15 publications

Asymmetry in presupposition projection: The case of conjunction

Asymmetry in presupposition projection: The case of conjunction

A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

Subjective Ought

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