V—The Rational Role of Experience

Martin, Michael T.

doi:10.1093/aristotelian/93.1.71

Cited by 17 publications

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“…But judgements about the reasonableness of other judgements are clearly of neither kind. And see Peacocke (1998), Martin (1998), andO'Brien (2003) for more general objections to the constitutive account and its central claim that higher-and lower-order states are not distinct entities. One particular worry is, for instance, that the postulated constitutive link between the lowerand higher-order states does not seem to provide the resources to explain how the latter can be epistemically grounded on, and constitute genuine instances of knowledge of, the former.…”

Section: Our Experience Of Judgementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Dorsch¹

2009

Mental Actions

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Section: Our Experience Of Judgementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Dorsch¹

2009

Mental Actions

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“…3 So the notion of consciousness that is in play here is access consciousness (Block, 1995). 4 Or her memory of it (Martin, 1993). 5 Henceforth, I will omit this qualification.…”

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Are There Different Kinds of Content?

Heck

2023

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

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The cup from which I am drinking water now is yellow, and I know that it is. Why does my belief that the cup is yellow count as knowledge? Presumably, the answer must involve some reference to my current perceptual experience: I see the cup, and I see that it is yellow. What is it for me to see that the cup is yellow? The obvious answer would seem to be that it is for me to stand in a certain relation-namely, the relation expressed by the verb 'to see'-to a proposition, namely, the proposition that the cup is yellow: Perception, that is to say, is a kind of propositional attitude, like belief, though it is also different from belief in many ways. So my seeing that the cup is yellow, being a kind of propositional attitude I take towards that proposition, can count as my reason for believing that the cup is yellow. I've thus got a reason for that belief, and it's a good one. No sort of inference from a prior judgement about my experience is necessary. Rather, I need only import the content of my perceptual state into cognition to believe it.If one could accept that much, then-though there would no doubt be many problems left to discuss-it would make the question how perceptual experience justifies perceptual beliefs significantly more tractable. But the problem, as I see it, is that accepting that much threatens to impose high costs. If the 'importation' model of perceptual justification is to be extended to all perceptually justified beliefs, then every concept that figures in a belief that is perceptually justifiable for a given subject must also be able to figure in the content of her perceptual experience: Only what the subject can conceptualize can play any justificatory role for her. It does not, of course, follow that there is nothing in the content of one's current perceptual experience that one cannot now conceptualize. But even if there is, it can play no role in thought: It cannot so much as figure in thought. A fortiori, non-conceptual elements of experience, if such there be, can play no role in one's decisions about what to believe or, more generally, one might conjecture, in any rational process. Elements of one's current perceptual experience that cannot be conceptualized would be of no significance for the thinking subject. Or, as Kant put it, in a famous passage:

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“…Many philosophers (see for example Evans 1982, Martin 1993, Heck 2000, Kelly 2001, Tye 2005 argue from one or more of these assumed differences between perceptual states 2 and conceptual states to the conclusion that these states have different kinds of content. These philosophers argue that conceptual states have only "conceptual content" and perceptual states have (at least some) "nonconceptual content", where the distinction between "conceptual content" and "nonconceptual content" is supposed to be substantial, i.e.…”

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Conceptuality and Generality: A Criticism of an Argument for Content Dualism

Duhau

2009

CRHF

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In this paper I discuss Heck’s (2007) new argument for content dualism. This argument is based on the claim that conceptual states, but not perceptual states, meet Evans’s Generality Constraint. Heck argues that this claim, together with the idea that the kind of content we should attribute to a mental state depends on which generalizations the state satisfies, implies that conceptual states and perceptual states have different kinds of contents. I argue, however, that it is unlikely that there is a plausible reading of the Generality Constraint under which it is non-trivially true both that conceptual states meet it and that perceptual states do not. Therefore, the soundness of Heck’s argument is dubious.

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V—The Rational Role of Experience

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Are There Different Kinds of Content?

Conceptuality and Generality: A Criticism of an Argument for Content Dualism

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