Vague Objects within Classical Logic and Standard Mereology, and without Indeterminate Identity

Abstract

Weatherson [8] argues that whoever accepts classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, should conclude that there are no vague objects. Barnes and Williams [1] claim that a supporter of vague objects who accepts classical logic and standard mereology should recognize that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. Even though it is not clearly stated, they all seem to be committed to the assumption that reality is ultimately constituted by mereological atoms. This assumption is not granted by standard mereology which instead remains silent on whether reality is atomic or gunky; therefore, I contend that whoever maintains classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, is not forced to conclude with Weatherson that there are no vague objects; nor is she compelled to revise her point of view according to Barnes and Williams's proposal and to accept that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity.

Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects

“…Williams 2008b is also explicit about the commitment to vague objects (such as surviving amoebas after fissions). It's also important that other philosophers take the Barnes-Williams theory to be a defense of vague objects (e.g., Akiba 2015a, 2015b, Abasnezhad 2016, Paganini 2017. 5 See Williams (2008a, p. 768) and Barnes and Williams (2009, p. 182).…”