Vagueness and identity

Garrett, Brian

doi:10.1093/analys/48.3.130

Cited by 22 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…20 See Burgess (1990) and Over (1989). 21 See Broome (1984), Garrett (1988), Johnsen (1989), Keefe (1995), Parsons (1987), and Zemach (1991). 22 Akiba (2000Akiba ( , 2004, Barnes (2010), Burgess (1990), Hawley (2002), Heck (1998), Lowe (1999), Morreau (2002), Noonan (2004), Paganini (2011), Tye (1990), Williams (2008aWilliams ( , 2008b.…”

Section: Ramificationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indeterminate Comprehension

Simon

2014

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Can we solve the Problem of the Many, and give a general account of the indeterminacy in definite descriptions that give rise to it, by appealing to metaphysically indeterminate entities? I argue that we cannot. I identify a feature common to the relevant class of definite descriptions, and derive a contradiction from the claim that each such description is satisfied by a metaphysically indeterminate entity.

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Section: Ramificationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indeterminate Comprehension

Simon

2014

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…7 B.J. Garrett (1988) points out that we can distinguish between the thesis that an identity statement is indeterminate as a result of vagueness and the more radical thesis that an identity relation is one of degree. Thus, one might wish to maintain that the claim that a species is native may be of indeterminate truth value while denying that nativity is a matter of degree.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strangers in a Strange Land: The Problem of Exotic Species

Woods¹,

Moriarty²

2001

Environmental Values

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Environmentalists consider invasions by exotic species of plants and animals to be one of the most serious environmental problems we face today, as well as one of the leading causes of biodiversity loss. We argue that in order to develop and enact sensible policies, it is crucial to consider two philosophical questions: (1) What exactly makes a species native or exotic, and (2) What values are at stake? We focus on the first of these two questions, and offer some preliminary suggestions with regard to the second. Through a series of case studies, we show that it is not always clear whether a species is native or exotic. We identify five possible criteria that could be used for distinguishing natives from exotics. Rather than identifying one of these criteria as the 'correct' one, we suggest that the concepts of 'native' and 'exotic' function more like what some philosophers have called cluster concepts. That is, there are several characteristics that are typical of native species, and a corresponding set of characteristics that are typical of exotic species. None of these characteristics is either necessary or sufficient for identifying a species as either native or exotic. We then identify several of the values that are at stake in dealing with exotic species, and we suggest that policies need to avoid being overly simplistic.

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“…Brian Garrett, in his [2], asserts that in Evans's argument his (1) and (5) are consistent and David Over, in his [6], appears to endorse this claim. But no such objection can be made to the argument just presented since, according to the conception of indefinite identity specified above as the target of the argument, the truth of '= (a= b)' requires the existence of a predicate true of a whose negation is true of b, whilst the truth of 'V (a= b)' rules out the existence of such a predicate.…”

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confidence: 98%

“…Despite these criticisms, however, I believe that fundamentally (despite some confused remarks on Evans's part about S5 and over-brevity in his explanation of his determinacy operator 'A '), Evans's attack on the notion of indefinite identity is sound. In what follows I first present what seems to me the most powerful version of Evans's argument and then respond to the recent criticisms of Over [6], Garrett [2] and Johnsen [3]. In doing so I attempt to make it clear that there is, in essence, only one reply to Evans available to the defender of indefinite identity, and that a most uninviting one, namely the defence of indefinite identity as a kind of relative identity (which I call 'mere indistinguishability in non-delta properties') and the rejection of a principle I shall refer to as 'the principle of the Diversity of the Definitely Dissimilar'.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If so, the believer in vague objects can say, he can block the moves from (1) to (2) and (3) to (4) in the argument above in just the way available to the proponent of the view that all indeterminacy in truth value is due to semantic indeterminacy, and in particular, that all indeterminacy in truth-value in identity statements is due to indeterminacy of denotation on the part of one or both of the singular terms flanking the sign of identity. Hence, he can conclude, the argument above fails to demonstrate any necessary incoherence in the idea of the existence of vague objects.…”

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confidence: 99%

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