“…Consider a weaker form of the Collapsing Principle that has been discussed (and rejected) by Erik Carlson: The Weak Collapsing Principle : For any x and y , if it is false that y is F er than x and not false that x is F er than y , then it is true that x is at least as F as y . (Carlson, , p. 456)…”
Section: The Weak Collapsing Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Weak Collapsing Principle : For any x and y , if it is false that y is F er than x and not false that x is F er than y , then it is true that x is at least as F as y . (Carlson, , p. 456)…”
Section: The Weak Collapsing Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, it may be false that Michelangelo is better than Mozart, indeterminate whether Mozart is better than Michelangelo, and also indeterminate whether Mozart is at least as good as Michelangelo … If so, the weak collapsing principle is violated. (Carlson, , p. 457)…”
Section: A Counterexample To the Weak Collapsing Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This assumption is controversial (cf. Carlson, ). Furthermore, consider a rule‐given comparison such as “Pareto better than”.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This objection, or rather the counterexamples to the principle, has been embraced by various value theorists and it has been developed in several steps. Ruth Chang () first presented the structure of the counterexample, and Erik Carlson (, ) then argued more forcefully for the point. Wlodek Rabinowicz () presented the objection in a different setting, and both Johan E. Gustafsson () and Luke Elson () then developed it further.…”
In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐conventional comparative relations (e.g., “parity,” “imprecise equality,” “incommensurability”) cannot exist. Broome's argument has faced a lot of scrutiny and a certain type of counterexample has been used to undermine it. Most of the counterexamples focus on the Collapsing Principle which plays a central role in Broome's argument. In this article we will take a closer look at the most common type of counterexample and propose how to adjust the Collapsing Principle in order to avoid objections based on these counterexamples. We argue that a weaker version of the Collapsing Principle is not susceptible to the classical counterexamples. Furthermore, after an explorative discussion about the intuitions behind the original principle, we show that this weaker formulation is at least as intuitive as the principle suggested by Broome.
“…Consider a weaker form of the Collapsing Principle that has been discussed (and rejected) by Erik Carlson: The Weak Collapsing Principle : For any x and y , if it is false that y is F er than x and not false that x is F er than y , then it is true that x is at least as F as y . (Carlson, , p. 456)…”
Section: The Weak Collapsing Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Weak Collapsing Principle : For any x and y , if it is false that y is F er than x and not false that x is F er than y , then it is true that x is at least as F as y . (Carlson, , p. 456)…”
Section: The Weak Collapsing Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, it may be false that Michelangelo is better than Mozart, indeterminate whether Mozart is better than Michelangelo, and also indeterminate whether Mozart is at least as good as Michelangelo … If so, the weak collapsing principle is violated. (Carlson, , p. 457)…”
Section: A Counterexample To the Weak Collapsing Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This assumption is controversial (cf. Carlson, ). Furthermore, consider a rule‐given comparison such as “Pareto better than”.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This objection, or rather the counterexamples to the principle, has been embraced by various value theorists and it has been developed in several steps. Ruth Chang () first presented the structure of the counterexample, and Erik Carlson (, ) then argued more forcefully for the point. Wlodek Rabinowicz () presented the objection in a different setting, and both Johan E. Gustafsson () and Luke Elson () then developed it further.…”
In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐conventional comparative relations (e.g., “parity,” “imprecise equality,” “incommensurability”) cannot exist. Broome's argument has faced a lot of scrutiny and a certain type of counterexample has been used to undermine it. Most of the counterexamples focus on the Collapsing Principle which plays a central role in Broome's argument. In this article we will take a closer look at the most common type of counterexample and propose how to adjust the Collapsing Principle in order to avoid objections based on these counterexamples. We argue that a weaker version of the Collapsing Principle is not susceptible to the classical counterexamples. Furthermore, after an explorative discussion about the intuitions behind the original principle, we show that this weaker formulation is at least as intuitive as the principle suggested by Broome.
Comparisons play an essential role in our lives. 1 When considering what patients should get treated first in the emergency room, we compare health conditions. We compare how promising different TV shows are when we decide how to entertain ourselves. We compare the menus of lunch restaurants to decide where to eat. We compare destinations before planning weekend trips. We compare career prospects before choosing what to study -and so on. Many comparisons like these are made without hesitation. To many, but, of course, not all, it is obvious that patients with gunshot wounds should be treated before those with sprained ankles, that The Sopranos is better than Days of Our Lives, that the local Italian restaurant is better than McDonald's, that a weekend in Paris is better than a weekend in Slough, and that the career prospects of a lawyer are better than those of a race car driver. However, some comparisons are not easy. Feelings of being at a loss and struggling when trying to determine what option is best are familiar to most of us. This book is about those hard comparisons when no option is at least as good as all the alternatives. It is about the situations in which it seems impossible to rank options in conventional ways and it seems as though conventional comparisons themselves are impossible-the book is about what can be broadly called "incommensurability."Examples of incommensurability abound. When Sartre's student, during World War II, faced the choice of joining the French resistance in England to fight the occupying Germans or staying in France and take care of his elderly mother, the alternatives seemed incommensurable (Sartre 1975). When asked if Mozart or Michelangelo is the better artist, many think that they are incommensurable (Chang 2002), and when contemplating whether deafness reduces one's health more or less than muteness, the health conditions seem incommensurable (Hausman 2015). Even though the stakes and values involved may differ significantly, these comparisons have one thing in common: they are comparisons in which we cannot determinately judge which alternative is best nor do the alternatives seem equally as good. Furthermore, the phenomenon does not 22 Henrik Andersson and Anders Herlitz 6 Similarly, Griffin (1986: 80-1) argued that they may be "roughly equal," but he probably had a view similar to the vagueness view in mind, according to which it could be indeterminate how value bearers relate.
How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as the other? Much recent literature on comparability problems focuses on what the appropriate explanation of the phenomenon is. Is it due to vagueness or the possibility of non-conventional comparative relations such as parity? This paper argues that the discussions on how to best explain comparability problems has reached an impasse at which it is hard to make any progress. To advance the discussion we suggest a new classification of comparability problems that focuses on the problems they cause for practical reasoning.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
