Vagueness: Welcome to the Quicksand

Tye, Michael

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00760.x

Cited by 45 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…e.g. [17]) that in order to express indeterminacy at least three truth values are needed: one needs some kind of 'status' which would reflect the fact that there is no fact of the matter as to whether a given statement is (definitely) true, or (definitely) false (no matter whether it will be another value, truth-value glut or truth-value gap). This third "status" is marked by "∇".…”

Section: The Interpretations Of "Indefinitely" and "Definitely" Operatorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And it is by no means obvious that in a three-valued logic LL and LL1 will be valid in this sense. 17…”

Section: Leibniz's Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Before exposing oneself to the dangers of 'the quicksand' (as M. Tye calls the intricacies of the issue of vagueness (Cf. [17]) one ought to make sure that one is not embarking on a venture that is bound to end in a contradiction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This contrapositive is sometimes called "the law of the diversity of dissimilar" 17. One logic in which LL is not valid is given by Johnsen, who adopts the Kleene strong tables.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Gareth evans’s argument against vague identity

Odrowąż‐Sypniewska

2003

LLP

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In the paper Evans's argument concerning indeterminate identity statements is presented and discussed. Evans's paper in which he formulated his argument is one of the most frequently discussed papers concerning identity. There are serious doubts concerning what Evans wanted to prove by his argument. Theorists have proposed two competing and incompatible interpretations. According to some, Evans purposefully constructed an invalid argument in order to demonstrate that the vague objects view cannot diagnose the fallacy and is therefore untenable. According to others, Evans wanted to formulate a (valid) argument to the effect that there cannot be vague identity statements whose vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects. As it has been argued, if it is the former interpretation which is correct, than the argument really is invalid, but it is doubtful whether it achieves its aim. It might be claimed that "the vague objects view" it refutes is not the view that most vague objects theorists hold. The main part of the paper is devoted to the second interpretation and the discussions concerning the validity of the argument on this interpretation. It appears that the vague objects theorist is in a position to object to the validity of every single step of the proof. * This paper is a shortened version of a chapter of my PhD thesis "Vagueness and Identity" written under the supervision of Prof.

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Section: The Interpretations Of "Indefinitely" and "Definitely" Operatorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And it is by no means obvious that in a three-valued logic LL and LL1 will be valid in this sense. 17…”

Section: Leibniz's Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This contrapositive is sometimes called "the law of the diversity of dissimilar" 17. One logic in which LL is not valid is given by Johnsen, who adopts the Kleene strong tables.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Gareth evans’s argument against vague identity

Odrowąż‐Sypniewska

2003

LLP

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“…Our definition of a borderline case may not automatically yield a definition of vagueness for properties. As Michael Tye (1995) notes, if there are vague objects, it will not do to say that property P is vague if and only if it is possible for it to have borderline cases. For a vague object might be a borderline case of F, even if F is perfectly precise.…”

Section: A Semantic Determinately Operator and (1) And (2) Againmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination

McLaughlin

1997

Nous

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Supervenience' is now part of the philosophical vocabulary of the analytical tradition. Jaegwon Kim has a major responsibility for this. It is fair to say that he has done more than anyone else to identify types of supervenience, to examine their pairwise logical relationships, and to explore their usefulness for various philosophical purposes. As a body, his papers so thoroughly and carefully examine supervenience that, after reading them, one can be left with the feeling there is little worth saying about supervenience that he has not said. I shall, however, attempt to make a few worthwhile points about supervenience, and to look at supervenience in one context in which Kim has not.The paper is divided into two parts, each with subsections. In the first part, I shall discuss some matters that have been extensively examined by Kim, namely what the basic types of supervenience are and how they are pairwise logically related; in the course of this discussion, I shall distinguish a weak from a strong notion of global supervenience. In the second part, I shall examine supervenience in a context in which Kim has not: I shall attempt to solve a puzzle that arises when we consider supervenience relations involving vague properties and/or predicates. This is, of course, not a special case of property/predicate supervenience, but the typical one: for virtually all properties/predicates are vague. 2 The two parts of the paper stand independently of each other. Of the discussion in the first part, essentially all that is presupposed in the second is the notion of "world strong supervenience" defined in section 1 of part I.

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Formalization

Hansson¹

2018

Introduction to Formal Philosophy

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Vagueness: Welcome to the Quicksand

Cited by 45 publications

References 6 publications

Gareth evans’s argument against vague identity

Gareth evans’s argument against vague identity

Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination

Formalization

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