Valence and Campaigns

Abstract

We present a model of two-candidate elections in which candidates are office-motivated, campaigning is voluntary and costly, and one candidate has a valence advantage. In equilibrium, the order of campaign announcements matters: Each candidate would prefer to announce his or her position after the other candidate has announced his or hers. The fundamental predictions of the model are (1) the impact of valence and campaigning costs on candidates' equilibrium behaviors is in general ambiguous, requiring further specification of the details of the electoral situation, and (2) in general, equilibrium platform announcements are essentially independent of the location of the median voter's ideal point. In addition, the model is consistent with elections in which both, only one, or neither candidate actively campaigns, and, finally, even when one candidate has a large valence advantage, there might be no equilibrium in which he or she will win the election with certainty.

Prior Margins of Victory and Legislative Careers: Competing Risks Regression Analysis in South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2015

“…Re-election is a pivotal route for continuing congressional careers for US legislators. Most US legislators who have sought re-election have been successful in winning their re-election bids (Wolak, 2007;Carter and Patty, 2015). While incumbent members are considered as re-election seekers, how their legislative careers end is diverse.…”

Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections

“…Such asymmetry in policy positions, unlike in Groseclose (2001) and Carter and Patty (2015), does not arise from an assumed and known asymmetry in the quality of the two competitors, and, unlike in Carrillo and Castanheira (2008), is not limited by the existence of only three exogenously given policy positions that parties can take. 4 In this paper I focus on a different relationship, namely the one between ex ante valence uncertainty and entry decisions of potential candidates who cannot commit to any policy platform other than their preferred one.…”

Are Moderates Better Representatives than Extremists? A Theory of Indirect Representation

“… 1 For discussions of spatial preferences, see Grofman (2004), Dewan and Shepsle (2011), Hinich and Munger (1992, 1996), and Eguia (2013). In terms of electoral competition, this basic framework is sometimes extended to include a candidate-specific “valence” dimension, e.g., Groseclose (2001), Schofield (2004), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), and Carter and Patty (2015). …”

“… 21 This literature has identified several causes for divergence, including policy motivations (e.g., Wittman 1983; Calvert 1985), deterring entry by third party candidates (e.g., Palfrey 1984; Callander 2005), incomplete information (e.g., Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani 2007), competition across heterogeneous districts (e.g., Callander 2005; Eyster and Kittsteiner 2007; Krasa and Polborn 2018), agency problems (e.g., Van Weelden 2013), and candidate/party “valences” (e.g., Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985; Groseclose 2001; Krasa and Polborn 2010, 2012; and Carter and Patty 2015). …”