Value-added indicators of school performance: A primer

Meyer, Robert R.

doi:10.1016/s0272-7757(96)00081-7

Cited by 140 publications

(112 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…To bring the key trade-o¤ into focus we start from the most favorable informational assumptions. We assume that su¢ cient data are available at the pupil level, as it is already well known that informationally less demanding accountability schemes cannot su¢ ciently correct for di¤erences in pupil characteristics (Meyer, 1997;Hanushek and Raymond, 2003). Furthermore the selection of relevant pupil test scores and its aggregation (over di¤erent dimensions and pupils) into a cardinal and comparable indicator of school output is assumed to be settled (Cawley et al, 1999;Neal, 2008).…”

Section: Accountability and Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet it remained largely unnoticed in the literature on school accountability. Meyer (1997) is the only one, as far as we know, that has drawn attention to the fact that schools cannot be ranked unambiguously according to performance, if the e¤ect of background variables on output di¤ers between them, but he did not integrate this observation in a general theoretical framework. 2 We provide a simple proof of the incompatibility between the two incentive axioms.…”

Section: Performance Incentives Create Selection Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…is usually considered to be the value-added of the school; see, e.g., Meyer (1997). If we de…ne corrected output e y j as value added, the per pupil subsidy reduces to (see appendix)…”

Section: The Trade-o¤ In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The average test score in a school strongly depends on the characteristics of the pupil population. Insu¢ ciently correcting for pupil characteristics may lead to a biased evaluation of school performance (Meyer, 1997;Ladd and Walsh, 2002;Hanushek and Raymond, 2003;Taylor and Nguyen, 2006;Neal, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?

Ooghe

Schokkaert

2015

Soc Choice Welf

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 7420 May 2013 ABSTRACTSchool Accountability: Can We Reward Schools and Avoid Pupil Selection? * School accountability schemes require measures of school performance, and these measures are in practice often based on pupil test scores. It is well-known that insufficiently correcting these test scores for pupil characteristics may provide incentives for inefficient pupil selection. We show that the trade-off between reward and pupil selection is not only a matter of sufficient information. A school accountability scheme that rewards school performance will create incentives for pupil selection, even under perfect information, unless the educational production function satisfies an (unrealistic) separability assumption. We propose different compromise solutions and discuss the resulting incentives in theory. The empirical relevance of our analysis -i.e., the rejection of the separability assumption and the magnitude of the incentives in the different compromise solutions -is illustrated with Flemish data. JEL Classification:H52, I22, I24

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Section: Accountability and Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Performance Incentives Create Selection Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…is usually considered to be the value-added of the school; see, e.g., Meyer (1997). If we de…ne corrected output e y j as value added, the per pupil subsidy reduces to (see appendix)…”

Section: The Trade-o¤ In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?

Ooghe

Schokkaert

2015

Soc Choice Welf

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“…Value-added models focus on growth in student achievement and produce estimates of the effects on growth attributable to individual teachers and schools rather than to other sources. The models are typically intricate, involving regression to adjust for differences in student and community characteristics (North Carolina State Board of Education, 2000; Meyer, 1997;Webster et al, 1998) and complex covariance matrices to account for multiple test scores from the same student and the nesting of students within classes and schools (Sanders et al, 1997;Webster et al, 1998).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncertainty in Rank Estimation: Implications for Value-Added Modeling Accountability Systems

Lockwood

Louis²,

McCaffrey

2002

Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics

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Accountability for public education often requires estimating and ranking the quality of individual teachers or schools on the basis of student test scores. Although the properties of estimators of teacheror-school effects are well established, less is known about the properties of rank estimators. We investigate performance of rank (percentile) estimators in a basic, two-stage hierarchical model capturing the essential features of the more complicated models that are commonly used to estimate effects. We use simulation to study mean squared error (MSE) performance of percentile estimates and to find the operating characteristics of decision rules based on estimated percentiles. Each depends on the signal-to-noise ratio (the ratio of the teacher or school variance component to the variance of the direct, teacher-or school-specific estimator) and only moderately on the number of teachers or schools. Results show that even when using optimal procedures, MSE is large for the commonly encountered variance ratios, with an unrealistically large ratio required for ideal performance. Percentile-specific MSE results reveal interesting interactions between variance ratios and estimators, especially for extreme percentiles, which are of considerable practical import. These interactions are apparent in the performance of decision rules for the identification of extreme percentiles, underscoring the statistical and practical complexity of the multiple-goal inferences faced in value-added modeling. Our results highlight the need to assess whether even optimal percentile estimators perform sufficiently well to be used in evaluating teachers or schools.

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Moving house for education in the pre‐school years

Hansen

2013

British Educational Res J

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This paper uses data from the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS) to examine house moves that take place in the pre-school years, focusing on families who move for the education of their children. We present results showing that education-related house moves do indeed occur in the pre-school years with particular types of parents making these education-related moves to ensure their children attend a good primary school. We then examine whether this demand for high quality schooling is associated with a house price premia by linking the MCS data to Land Registry data and show that parents are prepared to pay significantly more to buy a house located near to better performing primary schools, even before their children reach school starting age. We interpret this as evidence of demand for school quality in the early years as parents (especially more educated and advantaged parents) 'gear up' their quest for what they perceive to be better schooling for their children before they start school.

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Value-added indicators of school performance: A primer

Cited by 140 publications

References 11 publications

School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?

School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?

Uncertainty in Rank Estimation: Implications for Value-Added Modeling Accountability Systems

Moving house for education in the pre‐school years

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