2012
DOI: 10.2298/eka1293093s
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Value-based management and corporate governance: A study of Serbian corporations

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to determine the place and role of corporate governance and performance measures in the efforts of managers to maximize shareholder value, and the attitude of Serbian corporations toward these issues. The paper first analyses the importance of corporate governance and performance measures in the context of value-based management. Then, through the multiple case study, we investigate the attitude of seven Serbian corporations toward defining the general corporate objective, corpor… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 25 publications
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“…However, controlling shareholder has the power to expropriate minority shareholder rights, which results in frequent conflicts between controlling shareholder (La Porta et al, 2002;Young et al, 2008). In this article we investigate possible influence of ownership structure on bank profitability in the specific context of SEE transition economies characterised by underdeveloped stock market, high ownership concentration, high foreign ownership and weak investor protection (Radzic & Yuce, 2008;Suljkanovic, 2007;Stančić, Todorović, & Čupić, 2012a).…”
Section: Ownership Structure and Bank Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, controlling shareholder has the power to expropriate minority shareholder rights, which results in frequent conflicts between controlling shareholder (La Porta et al, 2002;Young et al, 2008). In this article we investigate possible influence of ownership structure on bank profitability in the specific context of SEE transition economies characterised by underdeveloped stock market, high ownership concentration, high foreign ownership and weak investor protection (Radzic & Yuce, 2008;Suljkanovic, 2007;Stančić, Todorović, & Čupić, 2012a).…”
Section: Ownership Structure and Bank Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Institutions that are important external governance mechanisms in developed economies, such as capital market, securities regulators, institutional investors, judiciary, are weak in transition economies. High quality of disclosure and strong boards of directors are, therefore, potentially important internal governance mechanisms in these economies (Stančić et al, 2012a). Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008) argue that the board is the most important part of a firm corporate governance structure.…”
Section: Board Structure and Bank Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…EVA was being used more frequently than the BSC. Seemingly the relatively poorly used EVA was (Stančić, Todorović & Čupić, 2012;Domanovic, 2013), this was an obvious forward. The conclusion that the VBM starts to be not only rhetoric but also supported by a sound methodology can be drawn.…”
Section: Corporate Performance Metricsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Naizgled relativno slabo korišćena EVA ipak je u stalnoj ili skoro stalnoj upotrebi u 1/4 od ukupnog broja preduzeća. U odnosu na ono što je otkriveno u ranijim studijama prakse u preduzećima u RS (Stančić, Todorović & Čupić, 2012;Domanovic, 2013), ovo predstavlja očigledni korak napred. Možemo zaključiti da VBM počinje da biva prisutan ne samo deklarativno, već i da je on podržan upotrebom dokazane metodologije.…”
Section: Merila Performansi Preduzeća -Cpmunclassified
“…Although Serbia initiated economic reforms at the end of the 1980s, the widespread economic reforms were conducted only after political, institutional and legal changes in the early 2000s. In addition, Serbia has a code-law legal system and offers strong legal (law) but weak effective (institutional) protection of investors, particularly minority shareholders (Stancic et al. , 2012; Nikolic and Babic, 2019).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%