2007
DOI: 10.1080/03088830701342973
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Value creation through corporate destruction? Corporate governance in shipping takeovers

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Cited by 30 publications
(14 citation statements)
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References 63 publications
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“…They report that the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) to acquirers and targets, measured over the 11 days around the deal announcement (from day -5 to +5), are 83% and 148%, respectively. 35 Syriopoulos and Theotokas (2007) focus on the tramp sector and examine three bids for acquiring Stelmar Shipping that were carried out during 2004 and find negative (positive) acquirer (target) returns, consistent with the general consensus in the M&A literature. Using various event windows, they document that the average acquirer CAR ranges from -22.4% to 1.58%, while that of the target is between 5.06% and 22.13%.…”
Section: Shipping Mandas: Drivers and Value Creationmentioning
confidence: 52%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…They report that the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) to acquirers and targets, measured over the 11 days around the deal announcement (from day -5 to +5), are 83% and 148%, respectively. 35 Syriopoulos and Theotokas (2007) focus on the tramp sector and examine three bids for acquiring Stelmar Shipping that were carried out during 2004 and find negative (positive) acquirer (target) returns, consistent with the general consensus in the M&A literature. Using various event windows, they document that the average acquirer CAR ranges from -22.4% to 1.58%, while that of the target is between 5.06% and 22.13%.…”
Section: Shipping Mandas: Drivers and Value Creationmentioning
confidence: 52%
“…34 Other studies also focus on shipping M&A motives. Syriopoulos and Theotokas (2007) and Merikas et al (2011) provide evidence in support of the disciplinary motive for takeovers in the shipping industry, and in particular the poor management hypothesis (see Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). The authors argue that in the case of Stelmar Shippinga tanker shipping company that 31 For a detailed overview of shipping M&As process and motives, see Alexandridis and Singh (2016).…”
Section: Shipping Mandas: Drivers and Value Creationmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Globalization and technological advancements led more maritime, shipping & logistics companies rely on capital markets to finance investment opportunities (Syriopoulos and Theotokas, 2007) such as Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) (Grammenos and Papapostolou, 2012). The listed shipping and logistics corporates not only appreciate the goodwill from the quality of corporate governance (CG) system, but also mitigate the inherent uncertainty and volatility of the shipping freight markets (Song and Panayides, 2012).…”
Section: Corporate Governance In Shipping Logistics Industrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Attainment of economies of scale in general and achievement of sufficient size to gain easier access to capital markets in particular are among the main motivating forces behind mergers and acquisitions (Steiner, 1975). Furthermore, empirical evidence (Syriopoulos and Theotokas, 2007) shows that mergers and acquisitions in the tanker sector have led to increasing shareholder value (the Stelmar case), at least in the short run and this may be an additional motivation for companies to engage in. …”
mentioning
confidence: 97%